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Abstract Over the last four decades the 1980 Hague Convention has provided for
the prompt return of children to their State of habitual residence. But now that
wrongful removals and retentions are most often carried out by primary carers, the
majority of whom will be mothers, the instrument has come under increasing
scrutiny, not least from the European Court of Human Rights. This article analyses
the Grand Chamber judgments in Neulinger and X v. Latvia and considers how
compliance with Article 8 ECHR should be achieved in the application of the Hague
Convention; prioritising return or reflection? In so doing it also reflects on whether a
summary return mechanism can continue to accord with twenty-first century
expectations and norms.
Keywords International child abduction  European Convention, Article 8 
European Court of Human Rights  1980 Hague Convention  UNCRC 1989  Best
interests  Neulinger v. Switzerland  X v. Latvia
1 Introduction
For almost 30 years the rationale underpinning the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter: 1980 Hague Conven-
tion), remained virtually unchallenged—wrongfully removed or retained children
should ordinarily be returned to their State of habitual residence and their return
should be achieved promptly to negate the harmful effects of the unilateral action.
Return was considered moreover to be in the best interests of children for it would
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then allow the most appropriate forum to adjudicate upon their future.1 Nevertheless
it was acknowledged that in a limited number of cases a return might not be in the
interests of the individual child and so exceptions were included which, if
established, would afford courts a discretion as to how to proceed.2 The policy of
return was also viewed by the drafters of the Convention to be in the interests of
children in general, for they envisaged this would deter unilateral action,3 and of
course it would provide an effective framework for children of divided international
family units to retain contact with both parents.4
For the Hague formula to work effectively and in accordance with the intention
of its drafters an extensive and demanding series of requirements must be satisfied.
In this, the necessity of expedition in all aspects of the pursuit and conduct of return
1 Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Convention by Pe´rez-Vera (1982), para. 16, para. 24. At para.
25 the Rapporteur explained: ‘The two objects of the Convention—the one preventive, the other designed
to secure the immediate reintegration of the child into its habitual environment—both correspond to a
specific idea of what constitutes the ‘‘best interests of the child’’’. And at para. 34: ‘[…] the authorities of
each State acknowledge that the authorities of one of them—those of the child’s habitual residence—are
in principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access.’ The Hague rationale continues to
be re-affirmed by leading appellate courts globally: (Australia) De L v. Director-General, NSW
Department of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640, at pp. 648–649; re-affirmed in RCB as litigation
guardian of EKV, CEV, CIV and LRV v. The Honourable Justice Colin James Forrest [2012] HCA 47,
(2012) 292 ALR 617, at para. 2; (Canada) W(V) v. S(D) [1996] 2 SCR 108, at para. 36; (Hong Kong) M v.
E [2015] HKCA 1247, at para. 5.5; (Ireland) In the matter of the Child Abduction and Enforcement of
Custody Orders Act 1991 and in the matter of TM and DM, (minors); The Minister for Justice, Equality
and Law Reform as the Central Authority for Ireland (EM), Applicant, v. JM, Respondent [2003] IR 178,
at pp. 185, 187; (New Zealand) Secretary for Justice (New Zealand Central Authority) v. H J [2007] 2
NZLR 289, at para. 5; (South Africa) Sonderup v. Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC), at paras. 28–31; KG v.
CB and others 2012 (4) SA 136 (SCA), at para. 19; (United Kingdom) Re E (Children) (Abduction:
Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144, at para. 8; (United States) Lozano v. Alvarez, 134 S.
Ct. 1224, 1228, 188 L. Ed. 2d 200, 207 (2014).
2 The primary exceptions are found within Art. 13, 1980 Hague Convention: non-exercise of custody
rights; consent/acquiescence in the abduction; return would expose child to a grave risk of harm; child’s
objections. Additionally, a return may be refused if not permitted by the fundamental principles of the
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Art. 20, 1980 Hague
Convention), or where more than 12 months have elapsed since the abduction and the commencement of
return proceedings, and the child is now settled in his new environment (Art. 12(2), 1980 Hague
Convention).
3 Whilst deterrence is not clearly articulated as an objective within the body of the Convention, this
implicit goal is acknowledged at several junctures within the Pe´rez-Vera (1982) Explanatory Report. At
para. 16 the Rapporteur explains that an effective way of deterring an abductor is to deprive his actions of
any practical or judicial consequences, which will be brought about by the restoration of the status quo.
This assimilation of remedy and policy is reiterated in the two subsequent paragraphs; first it is affirmed,
at para. 17, that the elements of Art. 1, 1980 Hague Convention can be regarded as a single object
considered at two different times, and that effective respect for rights of custody and access belongs on
‘the preventive level’. Then it is submitted at para. 18 that promoting return, or taking measures to avoid
removal ‘amount almost to the same thing’. The Constitutional Court of South Africa has held that
deterrence, like comity, is important and ‘consistent with the values endorsed by any open and democratic
society’. Sonderup v. Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC), at para. 31. Cf. Schuz (2013), pp. 98–102.
4 Cf. UNCRC, Art. 10(2); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter EU
Charter), Art. 24(3).
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proceedings is of central importance.5 Convention hearings must not be transformed
into a substantive examination of competing claims to custody,6 given that they are
simply to be an adjudication as to whether the child’s State of habitual residence
will be confirmed as the forum which will determine the child’s future.7 Moreover,
the longer an abducted child spends in the State of refuge the more difficult any
ultimate return.8 Alongside the need for expedition, the drafters were clear that the
instrument’s limited exceptions would have to be interpreted strictly; were too
liberal an interpretation adopted then the return remedy would be deprived of
meaningful effect.9 Conversely the same caveat could be extended to an overly
strict application of the exceptions for then the Convention would risk falling into
disrepute since children could be sent back in inappropriate situations.10
The challenge in finding the correct equilibrium between the promotion of return
and the protection of individual children has always been a very real one.
Furthermore the difficulties have increased over the 35 years since the Hague
Convention was adopted, for not only has the nature of child abduction changed
beyond recognition,11 but so has the prevailing legal landscape, whether in the
positive obligations falling upon Council of Europe Member States through the
interpretation that has been given to Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (hereinafter:
ECHR),12 or in the recognition of the rights and legal status of children, particularly
5 See for example: (Canada) W (V) v. S (D) [1996] 2 SCR 108, at para. 37; (United Kingdom) Re M
(Republic of Ireland) (Child’s Objections) (Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015] EWCA Civ
26, at para. 11. This is embodied in statute in certain Contracting States: (Australia) Family Law (Child
Abduction Convention) Regulations, reg. 15(2); (New Zealand) Care of Children Act, s. 107,
‘Applications to be dealt with speedily’. The issue has long been recognised and upheld by the ECtHR:
Maire v. Portugal, no. 48206/99, (2006) 43 EHRR 231, at para. 74; Maumousseau v. France, no.
39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822, at para. 83.
6 Art. 19, 1980 Hague Convention. Re M (Republic of Ireland) (Child’s Objections) (Joinder of Children
as Parties to Appeal) [2015] EWCA Civ 26, at para. 119.
7 See for example: (Australia) LK v. Director-General, Dept of Community Services [2009] HCA 9,
(2009) 253 ALR 202, at para. 26; (South Africa) Sonderup v. Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC), at para.
30; (United Kingdom) Re K (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014]
UKSC 29, [2014] AC 1401, at para. 83; (United States) Seaman v. Peterson, 766 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th
Cir. 2014), ‘[…] the central purpose of the Convention and ICARA in the case of an abducted child is for
the court to decide as a gatekeeper which of the contracting states is the proper forum in which the issue
of custody should be decided.’
8 Re M (Republic of Ireland) (Child’s Objections) (Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015]
EWCA Civ 26, at para. 11.
9 The exceptions are: ‘to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead
letter’, Pe´rez-Vera (1982) Explanatory Report, para. 34. In F (R) v. G (M), 2002 CarswellQue 1738 (CA)
(WL), Justice Chamberland stated, at para. 30: ‘[the Hague Convention] is also, in my view, a fragile tool
and any interpretation short of a rigorous one of the few exceptions inserted in the Convention would
rapidly compromise its efficacy.’
10 (Australia) DP v. Commonwealth Central Authority [2001] HCA 39, (2001) 206 CLR 401, at paras. 9,
44; (United Kingdom) Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144,
at para. 31; (United States) Lozano v. Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235, 188 L. Ed. 2d 200, 215 (2014).
11 Statistics for 2003 revealed the mother was the abductor in 68 % of cases, in 2008 the figure was
69 %: Lowe (2011a), para. 43.
12 See below at Sect. 2.3.
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after the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of
1989 (hereinafter: UNCRC).13 It should not perhaps be surprising that courts in
many jurisdictions have struggled to find an appropriate balance of the competing
interests and objectives.14 This in turn has given rise to complex issues as to how
best interests should be determined, and whether a short, medium or long term
perspective should be adopted.15
Whilst there have long been examples of national courts showing particular
flexibility in the application of the Convention or failing to adhere to the limitations
of the summary return mechanism, sometimes in respect of particular categories of
case,16 and sometimes for sustained periods of time,17 it has only been in the last
decade that there has been a credible challenge to the prioritisation of prompt return
in abduction cases. In its most radical manifestation the re-appraisal of child
abduction methodology would in effect curtail the application of the summary
return remedy where children were removed or retained by primary carer mothers.18
Another position is that greater regard should be paid to the interests of abductors
where domestic violence is at issue.19 A further approach is to prioritise the interests
of the individual abducted child to ensure that whatever the solution arrived at
accords with his best interests.20
13 In the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court has recognised in a Hague Convention case that children
‘are quite capable of being moral actors in their own right’. Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Foreign Custody
Rights) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619, at para. 57. See generally: Freeman (2010), p. 1; Stalford
(2012), Ch. 2.
14 In Sonderup v. Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC), at para. 29 the Constitutional Court of South Africa
characterised the issue as balancing the short-term and long-term best interests of children.
15 As regards Art. 13(1)(b), 1980 Hague Convention, it has been accepted by the United Kingdom
Supreme Court that it may not only be the child’s immediate future which is at issue: Re E (Children)
(Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144, at para. 35.
16 It has been held by the Polish Supreme Court that mothers and babies should not be separated: 7
October 1998, I CKN 745-98.
17 In France, in the early years of the application of the Hague Convention, the Cour de cassation
regularly upheld a liberal interpretation of the Art. 13(1)(b), 1980 Hague Convention exception, see for
example: Cass. Civ. 1e`re 12 juillet 1994, Rev. Crit. 84 (1995), p. 96 note H. Muir Watt; JCP 1996 IV 64
note H. Bosse-Platie`re, Defre´nois 1995, art. 36024, note J. Massip.
18 Judge Dedov in his dissenting opinion in Adzˇic´ v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, 12 March 2015 has held that
the Hague Convention is not suited to situations relating to the end of family life and submits that the
separation of a child under seven from his mother will always create a grave risk of harm as understood
by Art. 13(1)(b), 1980 Hague Convention. Equally there have long been calls for the Convention not to
apply to applications made by left behind fathers whose custody right is limited to a right of veto over the
removal of the child from the jurisdiction, for example: Bruch (2004–2005), p. 529. Cf. (United States)
Abbott v. Abbott, 560 US 1, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 2002; (United Kingdom) Re D (A Child) (Abduction:
Foreign Custody Rights) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619; Schuz (2013), p. 440.
19 See for example: Kaye (1999), p. 191; Weiner (2000–2001), p. 593; Gray (2003), p. 270; Weiner
(2004), p. 701.
20 For example in X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in
his concurring opinion, at para. OI-8, argued: ‘the sociological shift from a non-custodial abductor to a
custodial abductor, who is usually the primary caregiver, warrants a more individualised, fact-sensitive
determination of these cases in the light of a purposive and evolutive approach to the Hague defence
clauses’.
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Whilst certain academic commentators have called for reform, and there is a
degree of repositioning in the manner in which the Hague Convention is applied in
one long standing Contracting State,21 it is the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) which has brought the modus operandi of the
instrument to the fore. Much has already been written of the panoply of recent
decisions,22 especially the Grand Chamber rulings in Neulinger23 and X v. Latvia,24
but in the present article, as well as dissecting the various majority and dissenting
opinions, the focus will be on evaluating the judgments against the wider
international family law context. In particular, what do the recent Strasbourg
judgments indicate about the state of the Hague Convention, particularly its simple,
procedural return mechanism and its transposition of the best interests paradigm?
And, can a presumptive return mechanism continue to accord with twenty-first
century expectations and norms?
2 Prioritising Return
The simplicity of the Hague Convention’s summary return mechanism has long
been lauded.25 Technically, from the perspective of private international law, it was
a great innovation but in its practical operation the instrument has not uniformly
fulfilled expectations. The network of States Parties which is edging ever closer to
100, and includes many developing nations, is impressively large,26 but return rates
vary quite significantly,27 delays are frequent even in advanced first world members
of the network,28 and almost every key provision of the instrument has given rise to
21 Switzerland, discussed below.
22 Morley (2011); Walker (2010), p. 649; Silberman (2011), p. 733; Rietiker (2012a), p. 377; Rietiker
(2012b), p. 98; Trombetta-Panigadi (2013), p. 599; Carpaneto (2014), p. 931; Beaumont et al. (2015a),
p. 39; Keller and Heri (2015), p. 270.
23 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087.
24 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100.
25 Anton (1981), p. 556.
26 Available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last accessed 31
August 2015).
27 The most complete statistical data is that compiled for the 6th Review Special commission: Lowe
(2011a, b, c). From this data, analysing solely figures for litigation leading to judicial returns or judicial
refusals, it can be seen that the overall judicial refusal rate was 286 (36 %). However, this masks
considerable variations, both at regional and national levels. For EU States applying the Brussels IIa
Regulation, the figure was 160 (38 %), but this masks a discordance between intra-EU cases 103 (34 %)
and non-EU 57 (47 %). For Latin American States the figure was 54 (46 %) and for Australasian states it
was 19 (29 %), though there was a major difference between intra-Australasian cases 9 (22 %) and non-
Australasian requests 10 (42 %). The variance in judicial refusal rates at a national level is yet more
pronounced: Canada 12 %; United Kingdom 14 %; United States 23 %; Germany 41 %; Turkey 44 %;
France 46 %; Mexico 52 %; Spain 56 % and Poland 70 %.
28 Lowe (2011a), p. 41.
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inordinate amounts of litigation,29 sometimes with divergent interpretations
emerging as between or even within Contracting States.30
Where the drafters undoubtedly surpassed expectations however was in creating
a new global orthodoxy as regards the treatment of unilateral removals and
retentions. The prioritisation of return, the primacy of the child’s State of habitual
residence as the appropriate forum to adjudicate on the merits of underlying custody
disputes,31 and the promotion of expedition in decision making32 have all become
accepted as global principles and have influenced policy and practice outside the
confines of the Hague regime.33 In 2003 within the European Union, Member States
agreed, some reluctantly, to take these principles further in an attempt to realise
more effectively the objective of return.34 And in Strasbourg the ECtHR has sought
to respond to failings in individual abduction cases by recognising the positive
obligations Article 8 ECHR imposes on States and in so doing has attempted to
ensure compliance with appropriate minimum standards.35
2.1 Hague Convention
The emphasis placed by the drafters on return was inspired by their perception of the
substantive problem, as well as by their appreciation of the weakness of
contemporary private international law remedies.36 The removal or retention of
children was largely viewed as an action by frustrated fathers who did not exercise a
primary care role.37 Thereby in promoting return children would not only be going
back to their home environment but to their primary carer. In such circumstances the
drafters’ use of the expression the restoration of the status quo ante can be fully
understood.38 At the same time the drafters recognised that the harmonisation of
29 Re M (Republic of Ireland) (Child’s Objections) (Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015]
EWCA Civ 26, at paras. 12–13. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in X v.
Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. OI-14, where he refers to the ‘damaging effect
of differing, contradictory and confusing national case-law’.
30 The most significant current example relates to the interpretation of habitual residence, which is
subject to varying interpretations even within the United States, see for example Murphy v. Sloan 764
F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014); Ruiz v. Tenorio 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) and the discussion in the New
Zealand decisions Punter v. Secretary for Justice [2007] 1 NZLR 40, at para. 107.
31 Pe´rez-Vera (1982) Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Convention, para. 66.
32 See above n. 5.
33 See for example the Protocol concluded between members of the British and Pakistani judiciary which
sets down guidelines of best practice for the resolution of child abduction cases: http://www.fco.gov.uk/
resources/en/word/uk-pakistan-protocol (last accessed—via Government Web Archive—on 31 August
2015).
34 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000 (hereinafter: Brussels IIa Regulation), Official
Journal 2003 L 338/1, in particular Arts. 10, 11 and 42. See McEleavy (2005), p. 5.
35 See below at Sect. 2.3.
36 Beaumont and McEleavy (1999), pp. 16–23.
37 Dyer (1982), pp. 19–21.
38 Pe´rez-Vera (1982) Explanatory Report, paras. 17–18; Beaumont and McEleavy (1999), p. 86.
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jurisdiction rules would not be feasible and that recognition and enforcement would
be neither viable—as an order might not exist, or if one did, might not reflect the
realities of the child’s life—nor practicable given the delays which might entail at
both stages of the process.39 Once the summary return mechanism began to emerge
it can also be understood why the drafters acted with such vigour and determination
to ensure that it would be applied in the most optimum fashion.40 This was because
if the clock could be turned back quickly then the child could in theory resume his
previous life with the minimum of disruption.41
The clauses, strategies and techniques employed in and around the Hague
Convention to prioritise return are well known and need not be rehearsed in detail
here.42 They are found throughout the instrument, from the creation of the Central
Authority system,43 to the emphasis placed on expedition,44 and the breadth of the
summary return mechanism, through the wide scope afforded to custody rights.45
The objective is equally supported by the Explanatory Report, most notably in
seeking to ensure that the exceptions to return are interpreted restrictively.46 In
practice however, as the statistical returns for 2008 have shown, this has not
uniformly been achieved, and even where returns have been ordered it has rarely
been possible to meet the time limits envisaged in Article 11 of the 1980 Hague
Convention. A particular challenge for the Convention has been the manner of its
implementation. Understandably, particularly for a global instrument of its time,
Contracting States enjoy procedural autonomy in the conduct of return proceed-
ings.47 Inevitably therefore there are significant differences in practice, whether in
the treatment of evidence,48 the conduct and indeed types of appeal which may be
permitted,49 as well as regards the enforcement of return orders.50 Good practices
39 Beaumont and McEleavy (1999), pp. 19–21.
40 Anton (1981), p. 544.
41 Re M (Republic of Ireland) (Child’s Objections) (Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015]
EWCA Civ 26, at para. 11; X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 97.
42 See in general Hague Conference (2003).
43 Arts. 6–10.
44 Reference can be made to the general requirement in Art. 2, 1980 Hague Convention, the specific
obligation for judicial or administrative authorities in return proceedings in Art. 11, as well as repeated
references to prompt return in the Preamble, Art. 1, and Art. 7. There is equally the requirement for
central authorities to transmit applications without delay in Art. 9, and of course the Art. 11(2)
mechanism whereby an explanation can be sought where a decision has not been reached within 6 weeks.
45 Beaumont and McEleavy (1999), pp. 48 et seq.
46 Pe´rez-Vera (1982) Explanatory Report, para. 34.
47 Cf. criticism of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100,
at para. OI-14.
48 In many common law States Parties oral evidence is restricted, see Beaumont and McEleavy (1999),
pp. 257–258; Hague Conference (2003), pp. 35–36.
49 Cf. Hoholm v. Slovakia, no. 35632/13, 13 January 2015.
50 Enforcement has been an issue of particular importance in ECtHR case law, see below.
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have been shared by the Hague Conference, and reforms and improvements have
occurred, of which one of the most notable has been in the concentration of
jurisdiction in certain States, thereby reducing the number of competent courts and
building expertise amongst judges.51 But at the start of the twenty-first century the
real drive for reform and the prioritisation of return was coming, albeit in different
ways, from Brussels and Strasbourg.
2.2 European Union
The Europeanization of child abduction law was highly controversial, for the
political as well as the practical implications.52 It was clear during the negotiation of
what became the Brussels IIa Regulation53 that identifying and rectifying
weaknesses in the implementation and operation of the Hague Convention in
Member States was not a matter of interest.54 Rather, as a high profile, cross-border
problem, a bespoke European solution was needed which would provide ‘added
value’55 for the European citizen, and of course reflect well on the European
institutions.56 The compromise solution which was ultimately achieved, preserved
the Hague Convention for intra-Member State abductions, but saw it ‘comple-
mented’ by new, directly applicable rules.57 These rules have created a more strictly
regulated return regime and seek to ensure that the Member State of the child’s
habitual residence retains control over the child’s future.58 Deterrence is at the heart
of the new regime,59 and the Hague Convention’s expectation that applications be
dealt with in 6 weeks is nominally transformed into a rule.60
In theory the protection of the interests of individual abducted children is to be
assured by the control exercised by the authorities of the State of habitual
51 Hague Conference (2003), pp. 29–30.
52 Politically, this was a direct challenge to the Hague Conference, and an attempt to increase the
competence of the European Community, a goal now fully realized following Opinion 1/13 International
Child Abduction Convention [2015] 1 CMLR 880. Practically, an established global instrument risked
being replaced with little reflection on how this would impact upon third State abductions, as well as on
the Hague Convention as a whole.
53 Official Journal 2003 L 338/1.
54 McEleavy (2005), pp. 7, 16.
55 Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga v. Pelz [2011] ILPr 659, at para. 76 (AG). See Carpaneto (2014),
p. 931.
56 McEleavy (2005), p. 16.
57 Recital 17.
58 This is achieved by a combination of the review or ‘trumping’ mechanism in Art. 11(6)-(8), Brussels
IIa Regulation, the strict jurisdiction rule in Art. 10 and the automatic enforceability rule in Art. 42. See
Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga v. Pelz [2011] ILPr 659, at para. 44.
59 Case C-195/08 PPU Rinau v. Rinau [2008] ECR I-5271, at para. 52: ‘The Regulation seeks, in
particular, to deter child abductions between member states and, in cases of abduction, to obtain the
child’s return without delay.’
60 Art. 11(3), Brussels IIa Regulation. The statistical returns gathered for 2008 show that the rule has had
no meaningful impact, for only 15 % of return applications between Brussels IIa States were resolved
within 6 weeks compared with 16 % of applications received by Brussels IIa States from non-Brussels IIa
States: Lowe (2011b), p. 11.
372 P. McEleavy
123
residence,61 which should moreover avoid divergent assessments by the requested
court, where the child is actually present.62 But whilst the mechanism has been found
to comply with the obligations of Article 8,63 through the application of the
Bosphorus principle of equivalent protection of fundamental rights,64 in practice this
attempt to prioritise return does not appear to have delivered the expected dividend
for the European Union. There have been many high profile examples where the new
rules have failed to operate as intended,65 or indeed have been ignored entirely.66
And preliminary findings from an empirical study indicate that in practice the child is
rarely returned to the State of origin under the Article 11(8) mechanism.67
2.3 European Court of Human Rights
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, after holding that the positive
obligations Article 8 places on Council of Europe States in the matter of reuniting a
parent with his or her child must be interpreted in the light of the Hague
Convention,68 the ECtHR’s engagement with the 1980 instrument soared.69 The
applications coming before the Strasbourg Court highlighted many of the procedural
failings existing in a wide range of European States which were undermining the
effective application of the Hague Convention and the return of children. The
ECtHR found there to be positive obligations on States to: apply the Hague
Convention in an effective manner;70 make adequate and effective efforts to enforce
a left behind parent’s right to the return of his child as well as the child’s right to be
reunited with the left behind parent;71 interpret provisions in accordance with
international norms;72 and to take all necessary steps to facilitate the enforcement of
Hague Convention return orders.73 And, in some instances, this has led to general
61 Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga v. Pelz [2011] ILPr 659, at paras. 58-75. As a matter of EU law
the rules must be interpreted in accordance with the fundamental rights of the child as set out in Art. 24,
EU Charter, see Recital 33 and also Recital 12, Brussels IIa Regulation. See also Lenaerts (2013),
p. 1302. Cf. Walker and Beaumont (2011), p. 231; Kuipers (2012), p. 397.
62 Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga v. Pelz [2011] ILPr 659, at para. 76 (AG).
63 Povse and Povse v. Austria, no. 3890/11, [2014] 1 FLR 944. Cf. where a return order is made under
Art. 11(8), Brussels IIa Regulation: Sˇneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, no. 1437/09, (2013) 57 EHRR
1180. See Carpaneto (2014), p. 931.
64 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, no. 45036/98, (2006) 42 EHRR
1.
65 For example: Case C-195/08 PPU Rinau v. Rinau [2008] ECR I-5271; Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre
Zarraga v. Pelz [2011] ILPr 659.
66 Lo´pez Guio´ v. Slovakia, no. 10280/12, 3 June 2014, at para. 90.
67 Beaumont et al. (2015b), p. 124.
68 Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, (2001) 31 EHRR 212, at para. 95.
69 See generally: Beaumont (2009), p. 9.
70 Iosub Caras v. Romania, no. 7198/04, (2008) 47 EHRR 810; Deak v. Romania and the United
Kingdom, no. 19055/05, (2008) 47 EHRR 1095.
71 Iglesias Gil and AUI v. Spain, no. 56673/00, (2005) 40 EHRR 55.
72 Monory v. Hungary & Romania, no. 71099/01, (2005) 41 EHRR 771.
73 Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, (2001) 31 EHRR 212.
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measures being taken by States to prevent the recurrence of violations similar to
those found by the Court.74
Alongside such support for the practical operation of the Hague Convention,75
the ECtHR was equally fulsome in upholding the instrument’s rationale and return
agenda. This was exemplified in the case of Maumousseau and Washington v.
France76 where a primary carer mother complained that the interpretation given by
the French courts to the grave risk of harm exception in Article 13(1)(b) of the
Hague Convention had been too restrictive and that her daughter’s best interests had
not been considered completely. The Court held that it was entirely in agreement
with the philosophy underlying the Hague Convention, namely deterring the
proliferation of international child abductions, restoring the status quo ante and
leaving the issues of custody to be determined by the courts of the child’s habitual
residence.77 It accepted that the exceptions were to be interpreted strictly and added
that were the mother’s arguments to be accepted, then both the substance and
primary purpose of the Hague Convention would be rendered meaningless.78 The
Court was satisfied therefore that the child’s ‘best interests’, which lay in her prompt
return to her habitual environment, had been taken into account by the French
courts.79 Encouraging as this reasoning was for supporters of the Hague Conference,
Maumousseau did prove to be the high water mark for the Court’s unrestricted
prioritization of return.
3 Prioritising Reflection
Faced with a factual situation where one adult can, prima facie, be portrayed as a
wrong-doer and another as a victim,80 as well as a legal framework which at every
level appears to caution against: the subversion of the primary objective of return;
74 See for example: Execution of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Sylvester against
Austria (36812/97), Resolution CM/ResDH(2010)84[1]; Execution of the judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights Bianchi against Switzerland (7548/04), Resolution CM/ResDH(2008)58[1].
75 Such positive obligations continue to be upheld, see for example: Shaw v. Hungary, no. 6457/09,
[2012] 2 FLR 1314; Lo´pez Guio´ v. Slovakia, no. 10280/12, 3 June 2014; Ferrari v. Romania, no. 1714/10,
28 April 2015.
76 Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822.
77 Ibid., at para. 69.
78 Ibid., at para. 73.
79 Ibid., at para. 75.
80 The stereotypical characterisation of an abduction may not of course reflect the realities of the family
situation, for example where a primary carer mother is fleeing from extreme domestic violence. And so in
Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Foreign Custody Rights) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619, at para. 56, it
was held that the court’s view of the morality of the abductor’s actions should not influence a finding of
whether any of the Art. 13, 1980 Hague Convention exceptions has been established and that in general
moral evaluations of the abductor’s actions should not be made. Support for the avoidance of blame, or of
seeking to penalise the abductor, is found elsewhere: Case C-211/10 PPU Povse v. Alpago [2011] Fam.
199, at para. 48 (AG); including in pre-Convention English case law: Re L (Minors) (Wardship:
Jurisdiction) [1974] 1 WLR 250, at p. 264; Re R (Minors) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) [1981] 2 FLR 416, at
p. 425. But it has not been uniform, cf. Cannon v. Cannon [2004] EWCA Civ 1330, [2005] 1 WLR 32, at
para. 58. Indeed, the nature of certain actions are such that the standard is sometimes difficult to meet,
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the manipulation of processes and evidence by abductors; and the conflation of
return proceedings with those on the merits; then it can be understood how some
courts and policy makers have struggled to achieve an appropriate balance between
furthering the interests of children in general and protecting the interests of
individual abducted children. And moreover, that courts in some common law
jurisdictions might appear to have veered instinctively towards conformity and the
apparent simplicity afforded by an order for return.
For all the emphasis on return, it is not automatic as between Hague Contracting
States or even, at least yet, as between those EU Member States which are subject to
the Brussels IIa Regulation. Indeed an order for non-return in appropriate cases is
not in any way a failure, but rather the Convention operating as intended.81 The
challenge for courts in abduction situations is how to align the objectives of the
Convention with the contemporary profile of abduction cases, where it is the actions
of primary carer mothers which are most often at issue, where a return will not be
restoring the status quo ante in a literal sense, and where the mother may not have
strong connections to the child’s State of habitual residence and may face financial
challenges there.82 In addition, in many Contracting States regard must increasingly
be paid to the views of all capable minors and not simply to the objections of older
children. Furthermore courts must respond to the requirement for expedition in the
conduct of return proceedings, whilst ensuring due respect for procedural fairness.
It is against this context that there is fertile ground for critics of the Hague
approach and its emphasis on return and the interests of children in general.
However, before considering the most recent case law of the ECtHR in which such
criticism has been given expression, regard must be given to the scope which
already exists to gain more detailed information about the individual child within
the 1980 Convention, as well as the potential for bespoke solutions which exists
through the Brussels IIa Regulation.
3.1 1980 Hague Convention
The entire ethos of the Hague Child Abduction Convention, as reflected in its
structure and drafting, as well as in the travaux pre´paratoires and its subsequent
interpretation by most courts in English speaking jurisdictions, is such that the
prioritisation of reflection on the situation of the individual child both appears, and
is understood, as being limited. Nevertheless, scope actually exists within the
Convention for greater regard to be paid to the situation of individual abducted
children, and steps have been taken in certain jurisdictions, through case law and
legislation, to ensure that the policy of return does not prevail to such an extent that
inappropriate outcomes occur.
Footnote 80 continued
even for the Supreme Court: Re K (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening)
[2014] UKSC 29, [2014] AC 1401. The mother’s actions were described, at para. 65, as ‘cruel and high-
handed’.
81 Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Foreign Custody Rights) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619, at para. 51.
82 Lowe (2011a), where it is explained, at para. 43, that in 2008, 69 % of abductors were mothers. See
also Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144, at para. 7.
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3.1.1 A Hidden Mechanism for Greater Reflection
Whilst its material scope is wide, the third paragraph of Article 13 has been little
used or considered, indeed it might even be said to be hidden in plain sight.
Focussed upon ‘information relating to the social background of the child’, it
affords the relevant authorities an apparently unfettered discretion to consider and
evaluate issues relevant to the individual child where the Article 13 exceptions are
engaged.83 There is no limitation to situations where a court is exercising its
discretion where one of the five exceptions has actually been established,84 and once
the information is provided by the competent authorities in the child’s home State,
there is an obligation that it be taken into account.85
For all its breadth, the practical impact of the paragraph has though largely been
nullified by the ambiguity surrounding its operation. Whilst provision of the
background information must be by the authorities of the child’s State of habitual
residence, there is no obligation on those authorities to so act, nor a corresponding
requirement or even entitlement for the authorities in the requested State to seek
such information.86 And so whilst information must be considered where provided,
there is no actual mechanism in Article 13(3) ensuring its generation.
A better understanding of this somewhat incongruent construction is provided by
the terms of Article 7(d). This general provision outlining co-operation between
Central Authorities which creates an obligation to take all appropriate measures to
exchange information on the social background of the child, is limited to situations
where this is deemed ‘desirable’. Leaving to one side whether this implies a shared
view on the part of the two authorities concerned, it does reflect, in a more explicit
manner, the ethos of the Convention as a whole, one in which concentration on the
individual child is treated as the exception and not the rule.87
The potential of the provisions have though been embraced in a more positive,
child-centric sense in one English speaking jurisdiction with the Constitutional
Court of South Africa recommending that the country’s Central Authority—the
Office of the Family Advocate—liaise, ‘where possible’ with the corresponding
body of the requesting State.88 Indeed the Court held that it would be ‘reasonable to
expect the Family Advocate to initiate the exchange of information and provide the
results of those inquiries to the courts’.89 Referring to Article 13(3), the Court
83 Para. 3 commences: ‘In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, […].’ See Pe´rez-Vera
(1982) Explanatory Report, para. 117.
84 It was in this context that the provision was considered in Re A (Minors) (Abduction: Custody Rights)
(No. 2) [1993] Fam. 1, at p. 10.
85 Cf. X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 108, discussed below at Sect. 3.3.3.
86 See Comments of the Canadian Government to the Preliminary Draft Convention: Hague Conference
on Private International Law, Actes et Documents/Proceedings of the fourteenth Session, vol. III, Child
Abduction, 1982, p. 234. Cf. Comments of the German Government, at p. 217, which sought to make the
obtaining of such information obligatory. This was however to prevent exceptions being upheld on the
basis of cultural prejudice, as to which see Pe´rez-Vera (1982) Explanatory Report, para. 22.
87 Cf. Comments of the German Government, at p. 217.
88 Sonderup v. Tondelli [2000] ZACC 26, 2001 1 SA 1171, at para. 15.
89 Ibid.
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further noted that where one of the exceptions was at issue it would be helpful for
the requesting Central Authority to furnish any relevant information relating to the
circumstances of the child.
Elsewhere courts have generally been more circumspect. In other Anglophone
Contracting States there has only been isolated consideration of the provision,90with the
possibility for delay highlighted,91 it has though been considered by appellate courts in
continental European jurisdictions.92 Indeed it was recorded in the Grand Chamber
ruling inNeulinger that the Swiss appellate court had used theprovision to direct specific
questions to the requesting Central Authority as to how the child would be cared for if
returned to Israel.93However, following the position taken by theGrandChamber inX v.
Latvia, that courts must satisfy themselves that adequate safeguards are provided in the
State of origin,94 it may in the future assume much greater importance.
3.1.2 Recalibration through Case Law and Domestic Statute
The very low rates of judicial refusals in anglophone jurisdictions have previously
been noted.95 Indeed at one time English courts were so conscious of the importance
of ensuring the exceptions were applied strictly that a reference to it only being in
‘exceptional cases’ where a return should be refused,96 evolved into an additional
test of exceptionality.97 But just as a lax interpretation would subvert the objectives
of the Convention, so would one which was excessively strict. The need for
correction was quickly recognised, for as Lady Hale noted, an appropriate
application of the Convention did not demand that the exceptions never be upheld.98
In Re M after rejecting any test of exceptionality, she held that the circumstances in
90 (England & Wales) V v. B (A Minor) (Abduction) [1991] 1 FLR 266, at p. 274; Re A (Minors)
(Abduction: Custody Rights) (No. 2) [1993] Fam. 1, at p. 10; (Ireland) M (TM) v. D (M) [1999] IESC 8, at
paras. 19-22; (Scotland) Viola v. Viola, 1988 SLT 7, at p. 9; (United States) Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-
Menley, 58 F.3d 374 at p. 377 (8th Cir. 1995).
91 Re A; HA v. MB (Brussels II Revised: Article 11(7) Application) [2007] EWHC 2016 (Fam.), [2008] 1
FLR 289, at para. 20. In Viola v. Viola, 1988 SLT 7 the Outer House of the Court of Session held that
there was no obligation to delay making a ruling on a return application until a social background report
had been obtained.
92 (France) Cass. Civ. 1e`re, 17 Octobre 2007, Bull. Civ. 2007 1 No 320; (Poland) Decision of the
Supreme Court, 7 October 1998, I CKN 745-98.
93 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 31, at para. 41. The
Guardianship Division of the Vaud Cantonal Court further noted that the questions were not really
answered.
94 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 108, discussed below at Sect. 3.3.3.
95 See above n. 27.
96 Re S (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1993] Fam. 242, at p. 251.
97 Z v. Z (Abduction: Children’s Views) [2005] EWCA Civ 1012, [2006] 1 FLR 410, at para. 31; Vigreux
v. Michel [2006] EWCA Civ 630, [2006] 2 FLR 1180, at para. 65; Re M (A Child) (Abduction: Child’s
Objections) [2007] EWCA Civ 260, [2007] 2 FLR 72, at para. 80; Klentzeris v. Klentzeris [2007] EWCA
Civ 533, [2007] 2 FLR 996, at paras. 21, 36 and the discussion in Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of
Custody) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 AC 1288, at paras. 34–37.
98 Re D (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619, at para. 51. See also (United
States) Lozano v. Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235, 188 L. Ed. 2d 200, 215 (2014): ‘[…] the Convention
reflects a design to discourage child abduction. But the Convention does not pursue that goal at any cost.’
The ECtHR and the Hague Child Abduction Convention 377
123
which return may be refused were themselves exceptions to the general rule: ‘That
in itself is sufficient exceptionality. It is neither necessary nor desirable to import an
additional gloss into the Convention’.99 This recalibration in the application of the
exceptions is in line with the approach adopted by leading courts in other common
law Contracting States. In DP v. Commonwealth Central Authority100 the High
Court of Australia rejected a view that a narrow construction should be given to the
grave risk exception, noting simply that ‘The exception is to be given the meaning
its words require’. The Constitutional Court of South Africa has reacted similarly
noting that: ‘The paramountcy of the best interests of the child must inform our
understanding of the exemptions without undermining the integrity of the
Convention’.101 In Switzerland a more formalised approach has been adopted, to
respond essentially to situations involving primary carer abductions effected by
vulnerable mothers where their return is not an option and where their children
would be placed in care if sent back.102 Under a statutory rule, if three cumulative
criteria are satisfied in such circumstances, then an intolerable situation will be
deemed to exist for the purposes of Article 13(1)(b) of the Hague Convention.103
3.2 European Union
In the light of the primary emphasis of the revised rules on child abduction, in
reinforcing return and the control exercised by the Member State of the child’s
habitual residence, it might be questioned whether there could be any scope for
prioritising reflection in the conduct of European abduction proceedings. But there
is indeed potential for this to be achieved, albeit indirectly. First, alongside the more
exacting rules applicable to intra-EU removals and retentions are provisions which
ensure compliance with fundamental rights as contained within the EU Charter.104
And so a court cannot refuse to return a child unless the applicant has been given an
opportunity to be heard,105 and when applying Articles 12 and 13 of the Hague
Convention, the child must be given the opportunity to be heard, unless this appears
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or maturity.106 Whilst these may open
the door to greater reflection on the situation of the individual child and the most
99 Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 AC 1288, at para. 40.
100 DP v. Commonwealth Central Authority [2001] HCA 39, (2001) 206 CLR 401, at paras. 9, 44.
101 Sonderup v. Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC), at para. 33.
102 Loi fe´de´rale sur l’enle`vement d’enfants et les Conventions de la Haye sur la protection des enfants et
des adultes, 21 December 2007, considered in Bucher (2008), p. 139. The entry into force of the Federal
Act was welcomed by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/CHE/CO/2-4, 26 February
2015. See also Weiner (2008), p. 335.
103 Art. 5, Loi fe´de´rale sur l’enle`vement d’enfants et les Conventions de la Haye sur la protection des
enfants et des adultes: the placement of the child with the applicant parent would manifestly not be in the
child’s interests; the abductor is not in a position to care for the child in the State of habitual residence, or
it is not reasonable to expect this; and the placement of the child in foster care is manifestly not in the
interests of the child. See Bucher (2008), p. 157.
104 Official Journal 2012 C 326/02.
105 Art. 11(5), Brussels IIa Regulation, cf. Art. 47(2), EU Charter.
106 Art. 11(2), Brussels IIa Regulation, cf. Art. 24(1), EU Charter.
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appropriate outcome, other avenues will depend on the motivation of the relevant
judicial and administrative authorities.107
Under Article 11(4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation a return cannot be refused on the
basis of Article 13(1)(b) if it is established that ‘adequate arrangements have beenmade
to secure the protection of the child after his or her return’. The Regulation does not
specify how this is to be achieved or indeedwhere the burden lies, but the opportunity is
there for cooperation to ensure effective protective measures are put in place.108 It is to
be noted that in the expanded, 2015 version of the Commission’s Practice Guide for the
Application of the Brussels IIa Regulation,109 it is put forward that the mere existence
of protective procedures in the Member State of origin is not sufficient, rather ‘it must
be established that the authorities in the Member State of origin have taken concrete
measures to protect the child in question’.110 Were measures put in place through the
forthcoming revision of the Brussels IIa Regulation to give effect to this guidance, this
would mark a significant step forward, both in protecting children and facilitating safe
returns. Integrated solutions which ensure that the best interests of the individual child
are secured can also be achieved where courts respond positively and cooperate where
the Regulation’s Article 11(8) is activated where a non-return order is issued under
Article 13 of the Hague Convention.111 Unfortunately current evidence does not
indicate that this is regularly being achieved.112
3.3 European Court of Human Rights
3.3.1 Neulinger v. Switzerland
The re-alignment in the ECtHR’s position such as to place increased emphasis
on the situation of the individual abducted child rather than the policy of return,
stems from the remarkable Grand Chamber ruling in Neulinger,113 although its
roots may be found in earlier dissenting opinions, notably that of Judge Zupancˇicˇ
in Maumousseau.114 In the aftermath of its delivery, the 16 judge majority
107 McEleavy (2005), p. 34.
108 It has been held that Art. 11(4), Brussels IIa Regulation reflects the traditional English practice of the
applicant parent giving undertakings to the court: Re Y (A Child) (Abduction: Undertakings Given for
Return of Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 129, [2013] 2 FLR 649, at para. 1. See also Kinderis v. Kinderene
[2014] EWHC 693 (Fam.), at para. 46.
109 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/brussels_ii_practice_guide_en.pdf (last accessed 31
August 2015).
110 Para. 4.3.3. This would accord with recent guidance of the ECtHR, see X v. Latvia [GC], no.
27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 108, discussed below at Sect. 3.3.3.
111 McEleavy (2005), pp. 29 et seq.
112 Beaumont et al. (2015b), p. 124. See also Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga v. Pelz [2011] ILPr
659. Cf. Re A (Custody Decision after Maltese Non-Return Order: Brussels II Revised) [2006] EWHC
3397 (Fam.), [2007] 1 FLR 1923; M v. T (Abduction: Brussels II Revised, Art 11(7)) [2010] EWHC 1479,
[2010] 2 FLR 1685.
113 Neulinger v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087.
114 Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822.
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opinion in Neulinger generated great controversy,115 many pages of academic116
and judicial commentary117 as well as the remarkable extra-judicial intervention
of the Court’s then president, Judge Costa,118 and all for appearing to represent a
volte face on the part of the Strasbourg Court in how the ECHR should be
applied in Hague Convention child abduction cases. In large measure this was
down to the manner in which the majority judgment had been constructed,119
though it is an open question whether this was by design, omission, through the
mistaken belief that the Court’s position vis-a`-vis the Hague Convention was
sufficiently firmly anchored to withstand any challenge, or indeed as a result of
the vagaries of collegiate judgment writing, where a range of different views
clearly existed, and where staffers are involved in the process.120
One issue free from doubt was that by July 2010 the facts of the case had become
exceptional, and of a nature that would surely have been beyond the contemplation
of the Hague Convention’s drafters.121 Moreover it was the Strasbourg processes
themselves which were in large measure responsible for this exceptionality, at least
in respect of the extreme delays.122 The child, then aged 7, had been in the State of
refuge, Switzerland, for 5 years, 3 awaiting the conclusion of his and his mother’s
ECHR application; he had not seen his father during that time, the latter having
made no attempt to establish contact;123 and prior to the wrongful removal the
father’s contact had been limited by the Israeli courts to twice weekly and on a
supervised basis.124 That the enforcement of the child’s return after such a period of
time and in such circumstances was undesirable, and would have breached his rights
under Article 8 ECHR, could hardly be regarded as controversial.
The controversy and harm lay rather in the manner in which this conclusion was
reached. As noted the Court had previously provided unstinting support for the
Hague Convention and its objectives of return and deterrence. Now, when faced
115 See for example the Statement of the Secretary General: Van Loon (2011); Special Commission on
the practical operation of the 1980 and 1996 Hague Conventions (1–10 June 2011), Conclusions and
Recommendations. Available at: http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/concl28sc6_e.pdf (last accessed 31
August 2015).
116 See above n. 22.
117 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144, at paras. 19–28. At
para. 22 Lady Hale and Lord Wilson, delivering the judgment of the Court stated: ‘[…] the Court gives
the appearance of turning the swift, summary decision-making which is envisaged by the Hague
Convention into the full-blown examination of the child’s future in the requested state which it was the
very object of the Hague Convention to avoid’.
118 Costa (2011).
119 See generally: White (2009); Neuberger (2014), para. 35. And for a candid, first hand critique of the
manner in which ECtHR judgments are compiled, see: Loucaides (2010), p. 61.
120 Indeed, 7 members of the 16 judge majority adhered to a concurring or separate opinion.
121 Cf. Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619, at para. 4.
122 After allocation to the First Section, the President of the Chamber exercised the discretion granted
under Art. 39 of the Rules of Court to grant interim measures, which led to the return order being stayed,
Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 5. The
exceptional nature of such an outcome is discussed by Rietiker (2012a), p. 405.
123 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 47.
124 Ibid., at para. 24.
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with the challenge of a difficult case, it placed particular emphasis on the rights of
the individual child and Article 3(1) UNCRC, but without overt indication that its
comments were not intended to be of general application in each and every child
abduction case. There are many elements of the majority opinion which might
prima facie suggest that the Court was reversing its previous position, certainly if
these were to have general application. But almost hidden in the shadows of those
startling statements are sufficient indicators to justify the position of Judge Costa
that the Court was not embarking upon a wholesale revision in the interpretation and
application of Article 8 ECHR in Hague Convention cases. Nevertheless, Neulinger
has acted as the catalyst for the international child abduction human rights debate to
be re-framed and, X v. Latvia notwithstanding, it has created the conditions,
sometimes taken,125 sometimes not,126 for Chambers of the Strasbourg Court to
stray some distance from the spirit of the Hague Convention.
3.3.1.1 Best Interests127 In referring to Article 3(1) UNCRC to provide assistance in
interpreting Article 8 ECHR, the Grand Chamber was not embarking upon a new
approach. In Demir v. Turkey128 the Grand Chamber had already noted how the
specificities of the substantive obligations imposed on Contracting States by the
ECHR ‘may be interpreted, first, in the light of relevant international treaties that are
applicable in the particular sphere’129 and then gave examples, including where
reference had been made to the UNCRC.130 Indeed, passing reference had been
made to the UNCRC in earlier applications concerning the Hague Convention,
including Maumousseau.131 In the United Kingdom this approach to interpretation
has not only been accepted, but the Supreme Court itself has paid regard to the
125 Phostira Efthymiou et Ribeiro Fernandes v. Portugal, no. 66775/11, 5 February 2015. In cases prior
to the Grand Chamber ruling in X v. Latvia see: Raban v. Romania, no. 25437/08, [2011] 1 FLR 1130; B
v. Belgium, no. 4320/11, 10 July 2012.
126 Rouiller v. Switzerland, no. 3592/08, 22 July 2014.
127 See Eekelaar (2015), pp. 3 et seq., where it is argued that the distinction between ‘direct’ and
‘indirect’ measures concerning a child should not merely concern the weight to be accorded to best
interests—the ‘determining’ consideration as opposed to the ‘primary’ consideration—but also the
structure of the reasoning employed. In ‘indirect’ cases the focus should be ‘on reaching the ‘‘best’’
solution to the issue to be decided’ rather than on determining which outcome will be best for the
individual child. See also Fiorini (2016).
128 Demir v. Turkey, no. 34503/97, (2008) 48 EHRR 1272, at para. 69. See also Burnip v. Birmingham
City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 629, [2013] PTSR 117, at para. 21.
129 Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Art. 31(3)(c) and the discussion for and against
such an approach to interpretation in Rietiker (2012a), pp. 384 et seq. Cf. Lord Sumption where he
expresses, extra-judicially, his scepticism of the expansion of Art. 8 ECHR rights generally.
130 Pini v. Romania, no. 78028/01, 22 June 2004, at paras. 139, 144; and Emonet v. Switzerland, no.
39051/03, 13 December 2007, at paras. 65–66. See generally Kilkelly (2000), p. 87.
131 Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822, at para. 44. See also
Iglesias Gil and AUI v. Spain, no. 56673/00, (2005) 40 EHRR 55, at para. 28; Maire v. Portugal, no.
48206/99, (2006) 43 EHRR 231, at para. 56; and the non-Hague Convention case Bajrami v. Albania, no.
35853/04, (2008) 47 EHRR 547, at para. 32.
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UNCRC, finding that it can be relevant to questions concerning the rights of
children under the ECHR,132 and this notwithstanding the jurisdiction’s dualist
tradition, where the 1989 Convention is not part of the law.133
If the fact of the Grand Chamber’s reference to Article 3(1) was not remarkable,
then the manner in which it was done, and the interpretation afforded to ‘best
interests’, certainly were.
3.3.1.1 Presentation of Article 3(1) UNCRC In accordance with convention,
reference was made to ‘Relevant Domestic and International Law and Practice’
immediately after consideration of the facts of the application.134 In this the starting
point for the Neulinger majority was not the Hague Child Abduction Convention, as
had occurred in the Chamber ruling135 or in the Maumousseau judgment,136 but the
UNCRC.137 On its own one might question whether any significance, symbolic or
other, should be drawn from such a difference in ordering,138 given the Court had
not been consistent in this regard.139 But there were factors more clearly indicative
of a change in approach. First, the provisions of the UNCRC were announced by an
explanatory subtitle: ‘A. Protection of the rights of the child’. Never before had such
a subtitle been incorporated within any ECtHR judgment,140 a not insignificant fact
given the propensity for the near formulaic repetition of phraseology and legal
explanations in Strasbourg case law. Second, the presentation of the articles of the
UNCRC only included the Preamble, as well as Articles 7, 9, 14 and 18, with Article
3(1) mentioned thereafter.141 Whilst the Grand Chamber quoted from the
Committee on the Rights of the Child that the UNCRC ‘must be considered as a
whole, with the relationship between the various articles being taken into
132 R. (SG and others) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, [2015] 1 WLR
1449, at paras. 86, 101 and, in particular, at para. 137. See also Mathieson v. Secretary of State for Work
and Pensions [2015] UKSC 47, [2015] 1 WLR 3250, at paras. 39 et seq.
133 R. (SG and others), at paras. 82, 115, 137. Cf. contrary view of Lord Kerr, at para. 257.
134 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 48.
135 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [Chamber], no. 41615/07, 8 January 2009, at paras. 36–39.
136 Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822, at paras. 43–44.
137 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 48.
138 Cf. Rietiker (2012a), p. 391.
139 In previous child abduction cases differing approaches were followed: (UNCRC cited first) Iglesias
Gil and AUI v. Spain, no. 56673/00, (2005) 40 EHRR 55, at para. 28; Maire v. Portugal, no. 48206/99,
(2006) 43 EHRR 231, at para. 56; (Hague Convention cited first) Maumousseau and Washington v.
France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822, at paras. 43–44; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland
[Chamber], no. 41615/07, 8 January 2009, paras. 36–39, cf. analysis at para. 74; (only Hague Convention
cited) Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, (2001) 31 EHRR 212, at para. 77; Monory v. Romania
and Hungary, no. 71099/01, (2005) 41 EHRR 771, at paras. 51–52; Bianchi v. Switzerland, no. 7548/04,
22 June 2006, at para. 60. It should be noted that in its analysis of General Principles, at para. 131, the
Grand Chamber referred first to the 1980 Hague Convention, whilst in X v. Latvia, when presenting the
relevant international instruments, the Grand Chamber placed the 1980 Hague Convention first, at para.
34.
140 A HUDOC search in English, and in French, reveals only one subsequent use: Penchevi v. Bulgaria,
no. 77818/12, 10 February 2015, at para. 32.
141 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at paras. 48–50. In
the Chamber ruling reference was made to the Preamble, as well as Arts. 7, 9, 14 and 18, at para. 39.
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account’,142 it made no reference to the key provision, Article 11, whereby States
Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return of children
abroad, and promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements or
accession to existing agreements, or indeed Article 41, which provides that nothing
in the UNCRC ‘shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the
realization of the rights of the child and which may be contained in: (a) The law of a
State party; or (b) International law in force for that State.’ The omission of Article
11 in the Grand Chamber judgment, even if it was not referred to by the Chamber, is
particularly noteworthy not only for its relevance but since it was the only UNCRC
provision cited in such key early Hague cases as Iglesias Gil and AUI v. Spain143
and Maire v. Portugal,144 as well as in the non-Hague Convention case of Bajrami
v. Albania.145 Taken together, these elements would suggest that even if the Grand
Chamber was not seeking to establish a hierarchy of norms with the UNCRC at its
pinnacle,146 it was at the very least framing the international legal order relevant to
the interpretation of Article 8 so that the Hague Convention and its primary goal of
return was not to be prioritised with the same vigour as had previously occurred.
3.3.1.2 Consideration of Best Interests In the light of the consistency of the
judgments which had been handed down since Ignaccolo Zenide147 in supporting the
effective operation of the Hague Convention, as well as the accompanying analysis by
the Chamber in Neulinger and Maumousseau, it might have been anticipated that the
Grand Chamber in its first child abduction ruling would have acknowledged the
rationale underpinning the 1980 Convention, before considering how a return to Israel
might impact upon the Article 8 rights of a child who had by then been living in
Switzerland for 5 years. Not only did this not happen, but the analysis of the Court to
the issue of ‘best interests’ was at best superficial, if not misleading.148
In section II.A.2 the indeterminacy of the best interests standard was
acknowledged but with no consideration of how child abduction fits within the
UNCRC framework as a whole.149 Instead the Grand Chamber followed the bare
reproduction of ten Hague Convention articles,150 and relied upon an assertion that
courts of last resort in France, Finland and the United Kingdom had ‘expressly
incorporated the concept of the ‘‘child’s best interests’’ into their application of the
142 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 51.
143 Iglesias Gil and AUI v. Spain, no. 56673/00, (2005) 40 EHRR 55, at para. 28.
144 Maire v. Portugal, no. 48206/99, (2006) 43 EHRR 231, at para. 56.
145 Bajrami v. Albania, no. 35853/04, (2008) 47 EHRR 547, at para. 32.
146 Cf. Rietiker (2012a), p. 391.
147 Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, (2001) 31 EHRR 212, at para. 77.
148 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at paras. 49–56;
58–64.
149 Ibid., at para. 51. Indeterminacy has long been acknowledged by commentators, see the discussion in
Fortin (2009), pp. 292–293.
150 The principle of return is subsequently referred to in a single sentence, at para. 137. Cf. the detail
provided in the Chamber ruling, at paras. 74–78.
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[Art. 13(1)(b)] exception’. The justification for this submission, based on limited
summaries and isolated quotes, is scarcely convincing.
The House of Lords judgment which was cited, Re D (A Child) (Abduction:
Rights of Custody),151 certainly bore factual similarities to Neulinger, insofar as
extreme delays had led to the child spending almost 4 years in the State of refuge
before the final hearing, but the appeal itself turned on the interpretation of Articles
3, 5 and 15. Consideration was given obiter to the role of the exceptions by Lady
Hale, but not only did she acknowledge the guidance in the Pe´rez-Vera Explanatory
Report that the exceptions should be applied restrictively,152 but that the authorities
of the requested state were:
‘not to conduct their own investigation and evaluation of what will be best for
the child. There is a particular risk that an expansive application of article
13(b), which focuses on the situation of the child, could lead to this result.’153
Whilst she accepted that a restrictive application of Article 13 did not mean the
exceptions should never be applied at all, and that extreme delay would be a factor
in ascertaining whether a child would be exposed to a grave risk of an intolerable
situation if sent back, these findings do not equate with the sweeping conclusion
drawn by the Grand Chamber on the basis of a short quotation from Lord Hope.154
In stating that it was ‘impossible to believe that the child’s best interests would be
served by his return forthwith to Romania’155 the latter was making a general
observation, related to the delays encountered in the return application. It neither
justifies the interpretation given by the Grand Chamber, nor, in the light of Lady
Hale’s leading judgment, does it represent the manner in which the House of Lords
perceived the exceptions to return in general.
3.3.1.3 Article 8 The primary focus for the Grand Chamber was whether the
interference in the family life of the child and mother as understood by Article 8
ECHR was ‘necessary in a democratic society’,156 it clearly being ‘in accordance
with the law’, since it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and
freedoms of the child and his father.157 In keeping with Strasbourg methodology,
the assessment of the applicable ‘General Principles’ contains similarities with
earlier rulings, for example in Neulinger itself, as well as Maumousseau. And so the
‘decisive issue’ as to whether a fair balance had been struck between ‘the competing
interests at stake—those of the child, of the two parents, and of public order—’ and
whether this was within the margin of appreciation afforded to States, was
151 Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619.
152 Ibid., at para. 51, referring to the Pe´rez-Vera (1982) Explanatory Report, para. 34.
153 Ibid.
154 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, para. 60.
155 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 64; Re D (A
Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619, at para. 4.
156 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 91.
157 Ibid., at para. 106.
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replicated almost verbatim from the two judgments which had provided the greatest
support for the Hague Convention.158
Thereafter the Grand Chamber clearly parted company in its reasoning, affirming
that the ‘child’s best interests must be the primary consideration’ in the balancing
exercise.159 In this it sought to rely on the general statement in the Hague
Convention’s Preamble, although the latter is explicit in stating that it is the interests
of children which are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody.
However, it then went further still, noting that there was a broad consensus, including
in international law, that ‘in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must
be paramount’.160 Somewhat generously, Lady Hale subsequently described this as
‘putting matters a little too high’,161 for while it may be the case in substantive
domestic family law,162 it most certainly is not in international family law and is not
supported by the references used by the Grand Chamber to Article 3(1)163 or Article
24(2) of the EU Charter.164 As noted by the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department: ‘despite the looseness with which these
terms are sometimes used, ‘‘a primary consideration’’ is not the same as ‘‘the primary
consideration’’, still less as ‘‘the paramount consideration’’’.165
The significance of subjecting Hague abduction cases to the paramountcy
standard cannot be overstated, were it to happen it would represent the end of the
1980 Convention as a meaningful remedy, because the return hearing would simply
be transformed into a substantive assessment of the merits—the antithesis of what
the instrument stands for.166 Why such formulations were used by the Grand
Chamber is unclear, particularly in the light of the comments subsequently made by
the Court’s President.167 It should perhaps be concluded that this was no more than
an infelicitous error in drafting. Certainly, as noted above, loose language is not
uncommon in ECtHR judgments.168 Furthermore, there is a general lack of internal
158 Ibid., at para. 134; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [Chamber], no. 41615/07, 8 January 2009, at
para. 83; Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822, at para. 62.
159 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 134. In the
previous paragraph this direction had been trailed, with the Grand Chamber emphasizing the special
character of the ECHR as an instrument of ‘European public order (ordre public) for the protection of
individual human beings’.
160 Ibid., at para. 135.
161 R. (SG and others) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, [2015] 1 WLR
1449, at para. 214.
162 Ibid., at para 144, per Lord Hughes.
163 Art. 3(1), UNCRC states that the best interests of the child shall be ‘a primary consideration’. It is
only in Art. 21, in respect of adoption, that the UNCRC provides that ‘the best interests of the child shall
be the paramount consideration’.
164 Again the reference is to the child’s best interests being ‘a primary consideration’.
165 ZH (Tanzania) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 AC 166, at
para. 25.
166 Cf. Art. 19, 1980 Hague Convention: ‘A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the
child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.’ Cf. dissenting opinion
of Judges Berro-Lefe`vre and Karakas¸ in B v. Belgium, no. 4320/11, 10 July 2012, discussed below.
167 Costa (2011).
168 Fortin (2011), p. 956.
The ECtHR and the Hague Child Abduction Convention 385
123
coherence in paragraphs 134–136 since the supporting case law which is cited
reflects a more nuanced interpretation of the best interests standard, than either ‘the
primary’ or the ‘paramount’ standards. For example, when quoting from its
judgment in Sahin v. Germany,169 a decision on contact, the Grand Chamber
highlighted that ‘the child’s best interests may, depending on their nature and
seriousness, override those of the parents’.170 Such reasoning sits comfortably with
an orthodox application of the Hague Convention,171 and the Hague Convention’s
philosophy of return, which was acknowledged by the Grand Chamber, but only in a
single sentence.172
This pattern has not escaped judicial attention in the United Kingdom, either in
general or in respect of Neulinger in particular. In S v. L (No 2)173 Lord Carnwath,
acknowledging the ‘slightly different formulations and different shades of
emphasis’ in ECtHR judgments,174 held that the search for undue precision in
this area of the law was inappropriate. He added that whilst Neulinger, as a Grand
Chamber judgment would normally be treated as having greater authority,
paragraphs 134–136 ‘were largely designed to summarise earlier authority, and
on examination, and in the light of their treatment in later cases, cannot bear the
formulaic significance attributed to them by the appellant’s submissions’.175
The role of the academic commentator is though different to that of counsel
litigating an individual case. Whilst it may indeed not always be appropriate to over-
emphasise subtle changes in drafting, it is essential to look for broad patterns and so
to assess the direction of travel in which the Court is moving. In this regard,
whatever doubts might surround the internal consistency of the Grand Chamber
ruling in Neulinger, the overall effect of its drafting was to re-align the Strasbourg
Court’s bearing in the application of Article 8.176 If contrast were needed it is
provided by the judgment in Maumousseau where the best interests of the individual
child were seen by the majority from the perspective of the child’s right not to be
unilaterally removed or retained by a parent.177 As regards the Preamble, the
reference to the best interests of children was contextualized, with it noted that
Contracting Parties sought to protect children from the harmful effects of their
169 Sahin v. Germany, no. 30943/96, [2003] 2 FLR 671, at para. 66.
170 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 134.
171 Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619, at para. 51, per
Lady Hale: ‘A restrictive application of article 13 does not mean that it should never be applied at all’.
172 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 137. Cf.
detailed treatment in Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [Chamber], no. 41615/07, 8 January 2009, at
paras. 74–78 and in Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822, at
paras. 68–73.
173 S v. L (No 2) [2012] UKSC 30, 2013 SC (UKSC) 20.
174 Ibid., at para. 67.
175 Ibid., at para. 76.
176 Indeed that outrider for reform, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, described Neulinger in his concurring
opinion in X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. OI-10, as: ‘an evolutive and
purposive interpretation of the Hague Convention’.
177 Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822, at para. 75.
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wrongful removal and retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt
return to their State of habitual residence.178
In Neulinger the concentration on the individual child was further compounded
by the manner in which the Grand Chamber advocated that the child’s Article 8
rights be respected. To this end the child’s best interests were to be assessed in ‘each
individual case’, albeit subject to States’ margin of appreciation,179 and domestic
courts were to conduct:
‘an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of
factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and
medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the
respective interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining
what the best solution would be for the abducted child in the context of an
application for his return to his country of origin.’180
This most infamous passage of the Grand Chamber judgment was not however
new, the same text is found in Maumousseau.181 Crucially however, in the Grand
Chamber’s presentation of the relevant ‘General Principles’ it was transformed
from an observation, essentially one in support of the position of the French courts
in rejecting the application of the Article 13 exceptions, into an apparent
obligation, of general application, to ensure fairness in the decision-making
process.182
Whilst the potential impact of this statement was subsequently acknowledged by
a different formation of the Grand Chamber in X v. Latvia,183 Judge Costa had
sought to downplay its significance, remarking in 2011 that it was ‘made in the
specific context of proceedings for the return of an abducted child’.184 Although
prima facie surprising, a case can be made for this restrictive interpretation. In this it
is crucial to note that the Grand Chamber majority had accepted,185 although not
without hesitation,186 that the Swiss return order was within the margin of
appreciation afforded to the Federal Tribunal.187 The principles the ECtHR had
enunciated were therefore applied in respect of subsequent developments,
178 Ibid., at para. 68.
179 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 138.
180 Ibid., at para. 139.
181 Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822, at para. 74.
182 Cf. Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] EWCA Civ 361, [2011] 2 FLR 724, at para.
107, per Aikens LJ.
183 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at paras. 104–105: Neulinger, at para. 139
‘may and has indeed been read as suggesting that the domestic courts were required to conduct an in-
depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors’.
184 Costa (2011).
185 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 145.
186 The scale of the hesitation is quantifiable in that 5 members of the majority expressed disagreement
with this position in concurring or separate opinions: Judges Lorenzen, Kalaydjieva, Jocˇiene, Sajo´ and
Tsotsoria.
187 It may also be noted that the Grand Chamber did not demur in the finding that the removal of the child
to Switzerland was wrongful, at paras. 99–105.
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specifically at what would be the time of enforcement.188 It was in this context
therefore where the Grand Chamber concluded that were the child to be sent back
then his rights, and those of his mother, would be breached.189 This disaggregation
of the return order from its subsequent enforcement is significant. Enforcement,
which has given rise to difficulties in many Council of Europe States, is not a matter
governed by the Hague Convention, rather it is a matter for the national law of each
State Party. And whilst the ECtHR has done much to support effective enforcement
mechanisms and procedures,190 it did recognise at a very early stage that ‘a change
in the relevant facts may exceptionally justify the non-enforcement of a final return
order’.191
The ‘General Principles’ as set down by the majority may not have had
enforcement at their core, but this was the issue on which they ended and where a
large passage from Maumousseau was quoted.192 It was moreover immediately after
the reference to an ‘in-depth examination’.193 Against this context Judge Costa’s
defence of Neulinger can certainly be understood a little more clearly. Furthermore,
contemporaneous support that the majority was not seeking to depart wholeheart-
edly from the Court’s previous case law can also be derived from some of the
concurring opinions. Judge Lorenzen, who was joined by Judge Kalaydjieva, in
finding that the Swiss Federal Court had not assessed Article 13 properly, so that
there would be a violation of Article 8 irrespective of any subsequent develop-
ments,194 highlighted the unique circumstances of the case. And notwithstanding
that he had gone further than the majority opinion, he clarified that he was not
casting doubt on the Hague Convention, nor questioning ‘the application of that
convention in this Court’s case-law to date’.195 He further added that the refusal to
return the child would not undermine the normal application of the Hague
Convention. For his part, Judge Cabral Barreto, who sought to identify the
safeguards which would allow for the child’s return without entailing a violation of
Article 8, affirmed that he was against anything that could be seen as amounting to
acceptance of attitudes that would result in the Hague Convention ‘becoming a dead
letter’.196
188 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 145.
189 Ibid., at paras. 145–151. In this the Grand Chamber considered its case law on the expulsion of aliens:
Maslov v. Austri, no. 1638/03, [2009] INLR 47, at para. 77; Emre v. Switzerland, no. 42034/04, 22 May
2008, at para. 68.
190 See above at Sect. 2.3.
191 Sylvester v. Austria, no. 36812/97, (2003) 37 EHRR 417, at para. 63.
192 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 40, citing
from Maumousseau (para. 83).
193 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 139.
194 See also the joint separate opinion of Judges Jocˇiene, Sajo´ and Tsotsoria.
195 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 0–I9.
196 Ibid., at para. 0–II16.
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3.3.1.4 Reaction in England & Wales In England appellate courts acted promptly
in curtailing any potential Neulinger effect in the interpretation and application of
the Hague Convention.
In Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal)197 the family law specialists on
the Court of Appeal panel simply did not accept that a fundamental change of
approach had been intended. Black LJ noted that there had been nothing explicitly
disapproving of Maumousseau in the majority judgment,198 and that it would be
‘extraordinary’ if paragraph 139 contemplated a radical departure from Hague
Convention practice.199 Aikens LJ however relied upon a more technical approach
to negate the effect of the ‘in-depth examination’ standard. In this he held that the
ECtHR was not a tribunal whose function was to interpret Hague Convention
provisions, rather it was only if a domestic court was alleged to have violated the
ECHR in its interpretation of the Hague Convention that the latter must be
considered,200 but in so doing the ECtHR would be concentrating on the relevant
ECHR Article and not the interpretation of the Hague Convention.201 This also
found favour with the Supreme Court,202 which after explaining how the Hague
Convention was devised with the best interests of individual abducted children, as
well as of children generally, as a primary consideration, was happy to accept the
explanation of Judge Costa as regards Neulinger. Delivering the judgment of the
Court, Lady Hale and Lord Wilson also noted that a return which was not ordered
mechanically or automatically, but rather examined the particular circumstances of
the particular child, was ‘not the same as a full blown examination of the child’s
future’.203 And, if properly applied, it would be unlikely that the Hague Convention
would lead to a violation of Article 8 rights, whether of the child or either parent.204
3.3.2 Post Neulinger Case Law
The fallout from Neulinger may have been successfully contained in the United
Kingdom, but in Strasbourg the situation was quite different, serving only to
197 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] EWCA Civ 361, [2011] 2 FLR 724.
198 Ibid., at para. 117.
199 Ibid., para. 123. See also, at para. 65, per Thorpe LJ.
200 Cf. Monory v. Romania and Hungary, no. 71099/01, (2005) 41 EHRR 771, at para. 81 as regards the
interpretation of rights of custody under Art. 3, 1980 Hague Convention.
201 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] EWCA Civ 361, [2011] 2 FLR 724, at paras.
102, 108. See also at para. 70 per Thorpe LJ. The ECtHR has undoubtedly strayed into the direct
interpretation of Hague Convention articles on various occasions. This is evident in the case of Carlson v.
Switzerland, no. 49492/06, 8 November 2008, at para. 77 with regard to the exceptions of consent and
acquiescence; in the Grand Chamber ruling in X v. Latvia, no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para.
116 as to Art. 13(1)(b), 1980 Hague Convention and, at para. 117, with regard to Art. 20, 1980 Hague
Convention; and in Blaga v. Romania, no. 54443/10, 1 July 2014, at para. 80, in respect of the
interpretation of Art. 13(2), 1980 Hague Convention. See in particular Rietiker (2012a), at pp. 389–390.
Cf. Lo´pez Guio´ v. Slovakia, no. 10280/12, 3 June 2014, at para. 115, where the Court did note that it had
no jurisdiction ratione materiae to examine issues of compliance with the Hague Convention taken alone.
202 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144, at para. 31.
203 Ibid., at para. 26.
204 Ibid.
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increase the confusion and debate as to how the Court perceived the relationship
between Article 8 and the Hague Convention. On the one hand there was a series of
decisions on admissibility, rejecting applications by abducting mothers and children
where it was argued that return orders had breached their Article 8 rights.205 Whilst
these made due reference to Neulinger, in contrast to the Grand Chamber majority
judgment the spirit and rationale of the 1980 Convention were also fully embraced.
And so, for example, in MR v. Estonia206 the First Section acknowledged the Hague
Convention’s return presumption, as well as the necessity for a strict interpretation
of the exceptions.207 Furthermore the necessity for expedition was re-affirmed and it
was decided that return proceedings were not meant to determine the merits of the
custody issue.208 This apparent re-avowal of the Court’s traditional interpretation of
Article 8 vis-a`-vis international child abduction,209 which had so re-assured the
Court of Appeal in Re E,210 was though off-set by notable Chamber judgments in
which the ‘in-depth examination’ standard was applied in a more literal sense.
Whilst on one occasion this was used to establish that the decision-making
process leading to the establishment of the Article 13(1)(b) exception had been
flawed,211 it has more commonly been associated with non-returns. In X v. Latvia212
the Chamber referred to an in-depth investigation as being a ‘duty’,213 as well as
emphasizing the ‘paramount interests’214 of the child when finding that the
interference in the family life of the child and abductor brought about by the return
order to be disproportionate. In reaching this conclusion, and finding a breach of
Article 8, the Chamber noted, inter alia, that national courts must pay due respect to
the ‘arguable claims’ brought by the parties in the light of Article 13(1)(b), to ensure
that a return was in the child’s best interests. Furthermore, the Latvian court should
have assessed whether there were sufficient safeguards to render the child’s return to
Australia in her best interests.215
In B v. Belgium216 the Court, although it did acknowledge the modalities and
principles underpinning the Hague Convention, upheld the complaint of the
abductor and child who argued that the Court of Appeal of Ghent had neither
examined the entire family situation in sufficient depth, nor treated the child’s best
205 Van den Berg v. Netherlands, no. 7239/08, 2 November 2010 (by majority); Lipkowsky and
McCormack v. Germany, no. 26755/10, 18 January 2011 (unanimously); Tarkhova v. Ukraine, no.
8984/11, 6 September 2011 (unanimously); MR v. Estonia, no. 13420/12, (2013) 56 EHRR 136 (by
majority).
206 MR v. Estonia, no. 13420/12, (2013) 56 EHRR 136.
207 Ibid., at para. 43.
208 Ibid., at para. 42.
209 Cf. Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, (2010) 51 EHRR 822.
210 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] EWCA Civ 361, [2011] 2 FLR 724.
211 Karrer v. Romania, no. 16965/10, 21 February 2012.
212 X v. Latvia [Chamber], no. 27853/09, 13 December 2011.
213 Ibid., at para. 73.
214 Ibid., at para. 72.
215 Ibid., at para. 73. This was reprised by the majority in the Grand Chamber ruling, at para. 108.
216 B v. Belgium, no. 4320/11, 10 July 2012.
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interests as paramount.217 The Court highlighted the Court of Appeal’s failure to
verify itself the reality of the risks of the child being exposed to an intolerable
situation, as set out in the psychological reports submitted by the mother;218 the fact
it did not base its decision on the consideration that there were no grounds
objectively justifying the mother’s refusal to return, but simply proceeded on the
basis that it was most unlikely the mother would go back to the United States where
she risked imprisonment and the loss of parental authority; and that the time the
child had spent in Belgium should have been taken into account to consider more
deeply the actual implications of a return order. The Court concluded that the Court
of Appeal had not therefore been in a position to determine whether there was a risk
within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b), and that the decision-making process had
not met the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8, thereby the latter article
would be breached if the return order were enforced.
The difference in emphasis in these majority rulings,219 as well as the manner in
which the Chambers embraced their task, is clear and shares none of the ambiguity
which shrouded the approach of the Grand Chamber in Neulinger.220 The response
from the United Kingdom Supreme Court to the Latvia Chamber ruling was direct
and uncompromising,221 whilst extremely forceful dissenting opinions, recognizing
this state of affairs, were handed down in both the Latvia and Belgium cases.222 In
the latter, Judges Berro-Lefe`vre and Karakas¸ held that the majority had disregarded
its own guidance223 in simply substituting its own conclusions on the best interests
217 Ibid., at para. 66. As in Neulinger, see above n. 122, the Court, at paras. 35–41, exercised its
discretion under Art. 39 of the Rules of Court to grant interim measures, which led to the return order
being stayed.
218 Ibid., at para. 72. The Chamber further noted that the Public Prosecutor’s Office had recommended
such an independent evaluation. Such verification was endorsed by the Grand Chamber in X v. Latvia
[GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 116.
219 Reference may also be made to the unanimous ruling in Raban v. Romania, no. 25437/08, [2011] 1
FLR 1130, at para. 36, where the Neulinger reasoning was re-iterated, with the Chamber unambiguously
adding that: ‘the concept of the child’s best interests should be paramount in the procedures put in place
by the Hague Convention’. The interpretation provoked an official response by the Secretary General of
the Hague Conference at the 41st Meeting of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International
Law in Strasbourg on 17 March 2011: Van Loon (2011). A referral to the Grand Chamber, which was
supported by the UK and Germany (see Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] EWCA Civ
361, [2011] 2 FLR 724, at para. 12), was ultimately refused. See also Sˇneersone and Kampanella v. Italy,
no. 1437/09, (2013) 57 EHRR 1180 where Neulinger was applied in respect of a return order made under
the Brussels IIa Regulation, Art. 11(8).
220 The reliance on the ‘in-depth examination’ standard was however also the basis for a finding that the
decision-making process leading to the establishment of the Art. 13(1)(b), 1980 Hague Convention,
exception had been flawed: Karrer v. Romania, no. 16965/10, 21 February 2012.
221 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144, at para. 38, per
Lord Wilson: ‘With the utmost respect to our colleagues in Strasbourg, we reiterate our conviction, as
Reunite requests us to do, that neither the Hague Convention nor, surely, article 8 of the European
Convention requires the court which determines an application under the former to conduct an in-depth
examination of the sort described. Indeed it would be entirely inappropriate.’ See McEleavy (2012), p. 36.
222 Additionally, an extremely thoughtful and considered concurring judgment was provided by Judges
Tulkens and Keller, in the Belgium case, explaining their support for the majority and seeking to promote
conciliation between the different views expressed. This is considered below.
223 B v. Belgium, no. 4320/11, 10 July 2012, at paras. 59–60.
The ECtHR and the Hague Child Abduction Convention 391
123
of the child, and by acting effectively as a court of fourth instance. They expressed
concern that what they described as the exceptional outcome in Neulinger was
becoming the rule and cautioned that the detailed reasoning of the Ghent Court of
Appeal should not have been regarded as arbitrary because the Strasbourg Court
happened to have reached a different view, one that was based moreover solely on
the papers. Pointedly, they further recognized that requiring an in-depth review of
the whole family’s situation would indeed nullify the distinction between return
proceedings and substantive custody hearing, and ultimately void the Hague
Convention of its primary purpose.224
3.3.3 X v. Latvia—A Re-appraisal by the Grand Chamber?
When the X v. Latvia Chamber ruling was referred to the Grand Chamber it may
reasonably have been anticipated that certainty, in one direction or another, would
finally return. However, after a seemingly interminable wait for judgment of 13
months,225 the outcome was quite different. 16 of the 17 judges may have agreed on
the general principles to be applied in cases of child abduction covered by the
Hague Convention,226 and in this the primary doubts surrounding the Neulinger
judgment were ostensibly laid to rest,227 but they split equally on how those
procedural standards should be applied to the facts of the case. The obvious
advantage of common principles was therefore lost since they were immediately
applied in diametrically opposed ways. And so, as subsequent case law has proved,
the divisions in Chamber rulings have merely been perpetuated.
3.3.3.1 A Restatement of General Principles During the long gestation period the
presentation and construction of the Grand Chamber judgment were perfected, and
on this occasion no overt perception could arise that the standing of the Hague
Convention was in any way being downgraded or marginalised. In the exposition of
‘Law and Practice’, the 1980 instrument was cited first and contextualized, with
detailed reference to the Explanatory Report,228 as well as more recent Guides to
Good Practice.229 In the Court’s assessment of the applicable ‘General Principles’ it
first re-affirmed how treaty commitments entered into by a State subsequent to the
entry into force of the ECHR in respect of that State may engage its responsibility
for ECHR purposes, but then, in a first step towards repairing the self-inflicted
damage caused by Neulinger, it recalled that diverging commitments must be
224 They also underlined that the grave risk of harm envisaged by Art. 13, 1980 Hague Convention
should not only be based on separation from the abducting parent.
225 The hearing took place on 10 October 2012, with the judgment delivered on 26 November 2013.
226 The 17th member of the panel, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, delivered a concurring opinion, but held,
at para. OI-2, that he disagreed with the ‘equivocal principles’ set out by the majority at paras. 105–108.
227 Cf. the concurring opinion of Judge Pinto Pinto de Albuquerque, where he held, at para. OI-21, that
Neulinger was ‘alive and well’.
228 For criticism of the use of the Explanatory Report as an aid to interpretation, see RS v. Poland, no.
63777/09, 21 July 2015, dissenting opinion of Judges Nicolaou, Wojtyczek and Vehabovic´, at para. 9.
229 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at paras. 35–36. Reference was then made to
the UNCRC, at paras. 37–40, albeit with no mention of Art. 11, and to the EU Charter, at para. 41.
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harmonised as far as possible so that they produce effects that were fully in
accordance with existing law.230 Turning specifically to child abduction, the Court
reiterated that Article 8 ‘must be interpreted in the light of the Hague Convention’
as well as the UNCRC and relevant principles of international law.231 Again it
cautioned against conflict between treaties and held that the ECHR should be
interpreted and applied in a manner that rendered its guarantees practical and
effective.232
In presenting the balancing of the competing interests at stake, the Grand Chamber
amended its reference to the best interests of the child, noting that these must be ‘of’
primary consideration, rather than ‘the’ primary consideration.233 But it is of much
greater significance that in a clear attempt to move away from the ambiguity of its
previous ruling, it added that: ‘the objectives of prevention and immediate return
correspond to a specific conception of ‘‘the best interests of the child’’’.234 The Hague
philosophy was then explained and accepted,235 with the Grand Chamber providing the
explicit confirmation, absent in Neulinger, that a child’s best interests:
‘cannot be understood in an identical manner irrespective of whether the court
is examining a request for a child’s return in pursuance of the Hague
Convention or ruling on the merits of an application for custody or parental
authority, the latter proceedings being, in principle, unconnected to the
purpose of the Hague Convention.’236
It explained that in Hague proceedings best interests were to be evaluated in the
light of the exceptions, but noted that in this, domestic courts enjoyed a margin of
appreciation, but this was subject to European supervision.237
In the light of the dissenting opinion of Judges Berro-Lefe`vre and Karakas¸ in the
Belgium case, it is of note that the Grand Chamber further reiterated that it would
not be substituting its own assessment for that of the domestic courts, rather it would
be reviewing whether the decision-making process of the domestic court was fair,
had allowed the parties to present their case fully and that the best interests of the
child were defended.238 The Grand Chamber then stated, confirming the extra-
judicial view of Judge Costa, that the infamous reference to ‘an in-depth
examination of the entire family situation’ in Neulinger, at paragraph 139, did
not in itself set out any principle for the application of the 1980 Convention by
230 Ibid., at para. 92, quoting from Nada v. Switzerland, no. 10593/08, (2013) 56 EHRR 593, at paras.
168–170.
231 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 93.
232 Ibid., at para. 94.
233 Ibid., at para. 95. Cf. Neulinger, at para. 134.
234 Cf. Re F (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1991] Fam. 25, at p. 30.
235 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 97. The Grand Chamber noted that the
paramountcy of the best interests of children was associated in the Hague Convention with restoration of
the status quo, while taking account of the fact that non-return may sometimes prove justified for
objective reasons that correspond to the individual child’s interests.
236 Ibid., at para. 100.
237 Ibid., at para. 101.
238 Ibid., at para. 102.
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domestic courts.239 It was only at this point that the Grand Chamber turned to the
crucial issue of how a harmonious interpretation of the Hague Convention and the
ECHR could be achieved.
For the Grand Chamber, the co-existence of what it previously described as an
instrument of a procedural nature and a human rights treaty,240 required first, that
the exceptions to return be genuinely taken into account by the requested court and,
second, that they be evaluated in the light of Article 8. In this there were procedural
obligations in that domestic courts must not only consider arguable allegations of a
‘grave risk’ for the child in the event of return, but also make rulings on the
exceptions as a whole giving specific reasons, which must not be ‘automatic and
stereotyped’.241 Almost as if such guidance might be interpreted as once again
moving away from the Court’s traditional interpretation of the Hague Convention,
which it was apparently trying to rehabilitate, the Grand Chamber immediately re-
asserted the position adopted in Maumousseau242 that the exceptions must be
interpreted strictly.243 In this way the Grand Chamber might be viewed as seeking to
achieve an appropriate equilibrium, not only with the Hague Convention, but
equally with the spirit of the Neulinger judgment.
Harmonisation244 in presentation is quite different however to viability and
effectiveness in practice.245 On paper, a strict interpretation of exceptions to return
might appear feasible whilst at the same time facilitating a genuine appraisal of
arguable allegations, with these being upheld or rejected on the basis of sufficiently
reasoned decisions. But balancing standards and ultimately rationales which
scarcely rest easily together, is less straightforward. In summary proceedings
focussed on return, an ‘effective examination’,246 depending on how it is interpreted
and applied, carries the risk of causing delay, or leading the court to stray into the
underlying custody dispute.247 Similarly there is a clear danger in complying with
such requirements that abductors will be able to exploit them to their own
advantage, whether through delays or tactical manoeuvres. There is moreover a
239 Ibid., at para. 105. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in his concurring opinion at para. OI-4, framed this
issue around Art. 19, 1980 Hague Convention, noting that detailed examination by the court in the host
country did not imply any change of jurisdiction over parental responsibility, which remained in the State
of the child’s habitual residence.
240 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, (2012) 54 EHRR 1087, at para. 145; X v.
Latvia [Chamber], no. 27853/09, 13 December 2011, at para. 72. Cf. X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09,
(2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. OI-8, where Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in his concurring opinion,
described this description of the Hague Convention as ‘an over-simplistic view’.
241 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 107.
242 Ibid., at para. 73.
243 Ibid., at para. 107.
244 Cf. at para. 92.
245 Cf. at para. 94.
246 This was the core criterion for the Grand Chamber, and the majority in finding that a breach of Art. 8
ECHR had occurred, at para. 119. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in his concurring opinion, at para. OI-17,
submitted that this did not represent a meaningful change from the ‘in-depth examination’ standard of
Neulinger.
247 Re M (Republic of Ireland) (Child’s Objections) (Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015]
EWCA Civ 26, at para. 119.
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further challenge for courts, conceptual as well as practical, in how to balance a
strict standard of interpretation, with a sufficiently detailed assessment of the
exceptions.248 It is inevitable that great discipline will be required if an appropriate
and effective application of the Hague Convention and compliance with Article 8
ECHR is to be achieved.
The difficult task presented by the re-stated General Principles was almost
certainly increased for domestic courts, and the Grand Chamber’s putative
equilibrium unsettled, by the terms of the final paragraph of the section. Building
on the Chamber judgment,249 this set down a very general obligation, of
uncertain scope, that courts making return orders must satisfy themselves that
‘adequate safeguards are convincingly provided’ in the child’s State of habitual
residence, including ‘tangible protection measures’, where a known risk exists.250
Whilst the implications of this were not fully explored, reference need only be
made to Sˇneersone251 for an extremely broad vision of what this might entail.
The 8 judges of the dissent on the other hand appeared to be satisfied with the
more traditional, presumptive model employed by the Latvian courts that there
were ‘no grounds for doubting the quality of the welfare and social protection
provided to children in Australia’ in the light of evidence that Australian
legislation provided for the security of children and their protection against ill-
treatment within the family.252 Undoubtedly steps such as the inspection of
proposed accommodation or the qualitative evaluation of post-return contact and
care253 would ensure a more complete protection for the individual abducted
child, but such an approach also risks lengthening abduction proceedings and
ultimately broadens their scope. Desirable as the detailed verification of
safeguards might be, in the absence of any clear mechanism for this to be
achieved, or indeed resourced, its feasibility must be questioned.254 Equally the
248 The standard in England & Wales is found in the Supreme Court judgments: Re E (Children)
(Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144 and Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights
of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10, [2012] 2 AC 257.
249 X v. Latvia [Chamber], no. 27853/09, 13 December 2011, at para. 73, discussed above.
250 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 108.
251 Sˇneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, no. 1437/09, (2013) 57 EHRR 1180, at paras. 95-96. An intra-EU
abduction case, the application to the ECtHR concerned a return order under Art. 11(8), Brussels IIa
Regulation, it being argued, inter alia, that this was contrary to the child’s best interests. The child’s
return had previously been refused by a Latvian court of first instance under Art. 13(1)(b), 1980 Hague
Convention.
252 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. OII-9.
253 Cf. Sˇneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, no. 1437/09, (2013) 57 EHRR 1180, at paras. 95–96.
254 The UK Supreme Court in Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1
AC 144, at para. 37, called on the Hague Conference to elaborate a mechanism to facilitate the
recognition and enforcement of protective measures. The Court of Appeal and lower courts have however
turned to the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children as a mechanism to bring about the
enforceability of undertakings, considering these to be ‘measures of protection’: Re Y (A Child)
(Abduction: Undertakings Given for Return of Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 129, [2013] 2 FLR 649. Whether
this accords with the disconnection of the 1996 Hague Convention and the Brussels IIa Regulation (Art.
61) is another matter. The UK Supreme Court will consider the operation of the 1996 Hague Convention
in late 2015, after granting permission to appeal the Court of Appeal judgment in Re J (A Child) (Reunite
International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2015] EWCA Civ 329, [2015] 3 WLR 747.
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sufficiency of the justification for such an apparent extension of the Article 8
positive obligations could be questioned given that the Grand Chamber based this
on no more than the Hague Convention Preamble’s reference to children being
returned to ‘the State of their habitual residence’.255
3.3.3.2 Application of the General Principles The challenges inherent in applying
the Grand Chamber’s clarified ‘General Principles’ were immediately and fully
exposed when the 16 supporting judges divided equally on whether the Riga
Regional Court had indeed satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article
8 when dealing with the father’s application for the return of his daughter to
Australia. The Latvian courts had provided, within a very short timeframe,256 what
might be described as a textbook, strict response to the primary carer mother’s
arguments under Article 13.257 The appellate court held that there was no evidence
to substantiate the mother’s allegations against the father. Furthermore it refused to
rely upon a psychological assessment indicating the likelihood that immediate
separation from the mother would cause the child psychological trauma, since the
Hague proceedings were not concerned with custody rights. And it found that there
was no evidence to suggest a return to Australia would threaten the child’s safety, as
Australian legislation provided for the security of children and their protection
against mistreatment. For the 8 judges of the dissent whilst the reasons given by the
Latvian courts were expressed succinctly, they had nevertheless adequately
responded to the mother’s arguments and satisfied the procedural requirements
imposed by Article 8. The difference in approach of the majority however was
nothing short of remarkable, and of potentially great significance for the future
application of the Hague Convention. This is because the majority was not simply
favouring a more exacting application of the re-stated Article 8 obligations, but was
clearly reversing the burden of proof in the application of Article 13,258 and
confirming the extent of the obligations on the requested State to confirm or exclude
the existence of a grave risk of harm.259
The majority found that the mother’s submission of the psychologist’s certificate,
as well as her argument that the father had criminal convictions and had ill-treated
both her and the child, sufficed to require the Latvian courts: ‘to carry out
meaningful checks, enabling them to either confirm or exclude the existence of a
255 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 108.
256 The return request was received by the Latvian Central Authority on 22 September 2008, the first
instance judgment was delivered on 19 November and the appeal decided on 26 January 2009; a total of
little more than 5 months.
257 This was described, somewhat pejoratively by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, at para. OI-18, as a
‘superficial, hands-off handling of the child’s situation’.
258 One of the 8 judges subsequently submitted that this was not the case, see Phostira Efthymiou et
Ribeiro Fernandes v. Portugal, no. 66775/11, 5 February 2015, dissenting opinion of Judges Steiner and
Sicilianos, discussed below n. 291.
259 See also Carlson v. Switzerland, no. 49492/06, 8 November 2008, at para. 77, where the reversal of
the burden of proof by a Swiss court of first instance in the application of Art. 13(1)(a), 1980 Hague
Convention, was a factor in finding that there had been a breach of Art. 8 ECHR.
396 P. McEleavy
123
‘‘grave risk’’’.260 And by failing to take into the account the allegation, which was
substantiated by a certificate issued by a professional, Article 8 was found to have
been breached.261 As subsequently noted by the dissent, in proceedings under
Article 13 the burden of proof is of course on the party alleging the grave risk of
harm to provide evidence. But under the majority’s formula it would seem that once
a prima facie case had been made out by the abductor, then the onus would be
transferred to the court seised to determine whether it did or did not exist.262
Notwithstanding that the majority sought to discount minor inconveniences from the
scope of Article 13(1)(b),263 such reframing of the operation of the Hague
Convention, which offers a clear procedural advantage to the abductor, could only
serve to cause delay and require a level of investigation more appropriate in a full
merits assessment of the issue of custody than one centred on jurisdiction and
return.264 For the majority however the requirement for expedition placed on
domestic courts did not ‘exonerate them from the duty to undertake an effective
examination of allegations made by a party on the basis of one of the exceptions
expressly provided for’.265 This must be confirmation that despite the sanitizing of
the Neulinger judgment in X v. Latvia there is a clear desire on the part of many
Strasbourg judges to steer the treatment of international child abductions away from
the prioritization of return, towards a security first approach, prioritizing the
individual abducted child. This is articulated most clearly in the concluding
comments of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque:
‘Justice for children, even summary and provisional justice, can only be done
with a view to the entirety of the very tangible case at hand, i.e. of the actual
circumstances of each child involved. Only an in-depth or ‘effective’
evaluation of the child’s situation in the specific context of the return
application can provide such justice.’266
260 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 116. In this it referred to the equivalent
approach adopted by the Court in B v. Belgium, no. 4320/11, 10 July 2012, at para. 72. The dissent, at
para. OII-10, was un-persuaded that the Latvian courts should have taken the initiative by requesting
further information from the Australian authorities about the father’s criminal profile, previous
convictions and the charges of corruption allegedly brought against him.
261 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 117. The fact that the report had been
instructed by the mother alone did not absolve the Latvian courts from the obligation of effective
examination. The majority added that the ability of the mother to maintain contact with her child should
also have been considered.
262 The majority sought to reinforce this interpretation by noting that Art. 8 ECHR rights fell within the
scope of Art. 20, 1980 Hague Convention, and appearing to suggest that the latter provision should be
applied by the Latvian courts of their own motion. It is indeed the case that Art. 20 does not specify where
the burden of proof falls, but as Anton noted in the aftermath of the Convention’s adoption, it should fall
to the person opposing the return to make a prima facie case as to the exception’s applicability, Anton
(1981), p. 553. On the application of Art. 20 in the UK, see J v. C [2015] EWHC 2047 (Fam.), at paras.
67–86.
263 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 116.
264 This ‘easy critique’ was rejected by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, at para. OI-16, who held on the
contrary that: ‘An ‘‘in-depth’’ judicial enquiry does not have to be obtuse, ill-defined and self-indulgent.’
265 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. 118.
266 X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, (2014) 59 EHRR 100, at para. OI-21.
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3.3.4 The Effect of X v. Latvia
In marked contrast to the aftermath of Neulinger, the ruling in X v. Latvia has failed
to generate any judicial commentary or analysis in the United Kingdom in the first
20 months since it was handed down. This is reminiscent of the pre-Neulinger era
when ECtHR case law was rarely considered,267 indeed it was only after the first
Grand Chamber ruling that mention was made to the Maumousseau judgment in
English case law.268 Whilst this may be due to the clarity of directions given by the
Supreme Court in Re E269 and Re S,270 the last 2 years have seen several attempts to
invoke Article 20 to oppose a return order,271 one of which saw the exception
successfully invoked for the first time in one of the United Kingdom jurisdictions.272
There is however no indication from the formulation of the judgments that this
development is directly linked to the evolution in Strasbourg reasoning,273 though
the courts undoubtedly have a greater sensitivity for Article 8 and human rights
arguments.274
In Strasbourg the picture continues to be mixed. Whilst a preponderance of
judgments have indeed displayed a strong support for the objective of return and a
strict interpretation of the exceptions in their application of Article 8,275 some of
these have included dissenting opinions which appear to reject the fundamental
premise of the Hague Convention.276 Moreover, in the case of Phostira Efthymiou et
Ribeiro Fernandes v. Portugal277 the Court favoured an approach which is difficult
to reconcile with the 1980 instrument. Even within the judgments supportive of the
1980 Convention, there is evidence of the tension between the different facets of the
Latvia ruling. For example in Blaga v. Romania278 the Court expressed concern at
the emphasis placed on the objections of the children to a return, the insufficient
balancing of the applicant father’s right to family life; the failure to consider the
feasibility of return, or its impact, on the children; as well as the domestic
authorities failure to act expeditiously in the return proceedings. And for these
reasons the Court found that the decision-making process under domestic law did
267 See for example: Re K (Children) (Rights of Custody: Spain) [2009] EWHC 1066 (Fam.), [2010] 1
FLR 57, at para. 54, (rights of unmarried fathers); Re H (Abduction: Jurisdiction) [2009] EWHC 2280
(Fam.), [2010] 1 FLR 598, at para. 28, (delays in the conduct of Hague return proceedings).
268 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] EWCA Civ 361, [2011] 2 FLR 724.
269 Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144.
270 Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10, [2012] 2 AC 257.
271 F v. F [2014] EWHC 3971 (Fam.); J v. C [2015] EWHC 2047 (Fam.).
272 SP v. EB [2014] EWHC 3964 (Fam.), at para. 22.
273 If there was a factor in SP v. EB it may have been the desire to avoid the case falling within the scope
of the Art. 11(6)-(8) trumping mechanism of the Brussels IIa Regulation, see at para. 27.
274 J v. C [2015] EWHC 2047 (Fam.), at paras. 67–86.
275 Rouiller v. Switzerland, no. 3592/08, 22 July 2014; Gajtani v. Switzerland, no. 43730/07, 9 September
2014; GS v. Georgia, no. 2361/13, 21 July 2015.
276 For consideration of recent jurisprudence (in English) see Deschuyteneer (2015), p. 148.
277 Phostira Efthymiou et Ribeiro Fernandes v. Portugal, no. 66775/11, 5 February 2015.
278 Blaga v. Romania, no. 54443/10, 1 July 2014.
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not satisfy the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8.279 However, at the
same time it re-affirmed that the interests of the child were paramount in abduction
cases, which led to the surprising declaration that after more than 13 months away,
the Romanian courts may have been justified to hold that the children’s family
situation had changed and that it was in their best interests to remain.280 Ultimately
however this reasoning was not pursued, the Court concluding that the change in
circumstances had been considerably influenced by the slow reaction of the
Romanian authorities.281
In RS v. Poland282 it is the dissenting judgment of 3 of the 7 judges which
stands out for refusing to accept that there had been a violation of the applicant
father’s Article 8 rights. The children had travelled to Poland with their mother
for a vacation, but whilst there the mother issued divorce proceedings and was
granted interim custody. She then refused to return and the father issued Hague
Convention proceedings. In clear opposition to the principles of the 1980
Convention, the Polish courts declined to find that the retention had been
wrongful, given the interim order that had been awarded in the mother’s favour.
Judges Nicolaou, Wojtyczek and Vehabovic´ began by noting that the mother
could not expect a decent life in Switzerland and had no alternative but to seek a
new beginning in her home country. They held that the Polish court was entitled
to consider that it unavoidably had to deal with the custody issue alongside the
divorce petition. And further, they added that the decision not to return the
children could justifiably be regarded as falling within the ambit of the Hague
Convention’s exceptions. Such a blatant conflation of merits issues with
adjudication on the question of return pales in comparison however when
compared with the comments of Judge Dedov in Adzˇic´ v. Croatia.283 In a sole
dissenting judgment, he stated bluntly that the summary return mechanism was
‘not suitable for the assessment of rights under Article 8 of the Convention, as the
Hague Convention does not provide a comprehensive approach to the conduct of
the return proceedings’. Like the dissenting judges in RS v. Poland, he highlighted
the serious vulnerability of mothers who were completely dependent on their
husbands, as well as the vulnerability of children, especially the very young, for
whom separation from the mother would lead to distress. He argued that a child’s
best interests, from a personal development perspective, would depend on a
variety of individual circumstances, in particular his age and level of maturity, the
presence or absence of his parents as well as his environment and experiences. He
further submitted that the separation of a child under seven from his mother would
always lead to a grave risk of harm for the purposes of Article 13(1)(b).284
279 Judge Lo´pez Guerra joined by Judge Motoc dissented on the violation of Art. 8 ECHR.
280 Blaga v. Romania, no. 54443/10, 1 July 2014, at para. 88.
281 Ibid., at para. 89.
282 RS v. Poland, no. 63777/09, 21 July 2015.
283 Adzˇic´ v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, 12 March 2015.
284 As regards children aged 7–13, he suggested that return was more realistic, unless there was a really
grave risk, whilst teenagers should have the right to decide for themselves and express their own opinion.
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Phostira Efthymiou et Ribeiro Fernandes v. Portugal285 involved a standard
wrongful retention of a very young child by her mother following an agreed
vacation. A return order made within 4 months was overturned on appeal and, after
almost 19 months in Portugal, the Supreme Court, favouring a strict interpretation
of Article 13(1)(b), reinstated the original order. The ECtHR, by a 5:2 majority,
found that the decision-making processes had not met the procedural requirements
inherent in Article 8. The reasoning employed in the judgment and dissenting
opinion re-awakens the differences of emphasis present in the Grand Chamber
ruling in X v. Latvia. For the majority the reasoning of the domestic courts was
particularly succinct and based on limited evidence. The previous situation of the
child was unknown,286 and referring to Article 13(3) of the Hague Convention it
was noted that additional information had not been sought from the Cypriot central
authority concerning the situation of the father, as well as his inability to care for the
child, which had been alleged by the mother.287 Furthermore evidence presented by
the mother, including a psychologist’s report, was not considered by the Supreme
Court.288 The proceedings were also deemed to have lasted an excessive period of
time,289 and the child appeared settled in her new environment.290 In contrast,
Judges Steiner and Sicilianos found that the Supreme Court had acted within its
margin of appreciation in giving a stricter interpretation to Article 13(1)(b) than the
Court of Appeal.291 Referring to the majority’s application of the General Principles
in X v. Latvia, they noted that it was implicit, but clear, that the exceptions were to
be interpreted strictly and that the burden of proof was on the person opposing
return. Strikingly they observed that if a return was refused each time a psychologist
considered there would be emotional consequences for young child then the 1980
Convention would risk being emptied of its meaning and purpose.
Whilst Phostira Efthymiou is now an isolated example of the Court showing an
indulgent approach faced with a primary carer abduction involving a young child, it
would be disingenuous simply to categorise it as a rogue case.292 Taken together
with the dissenting opinions in the judgments it shows rather that there is a cohort of
Strasbourg judges who do see the resolution of international child abduction cases in
very different terms to those set out in the Hague Convention, one in which return is
far from prioritised. Moreover, given the formation of Chambers and the manner in
which judgments are composed,293 it is inevitable that this fragmentation of case
285 Phostira Efthymiou et Ribeiro Fernandes v. Portugal, no. 66775/11, 5 February 2015.
286 Ibid., at para. 48.
287 Ibid., at para. 49.
288 Ibid., at para. 50.
289 Ibid., at para. 52. The mother was not deemed responsible for this delay.
290 Ibid., at para. 53.
291 The significance of this interpretation, and indeed the dissent, is increased when it is recalled that
Judge Sicilianos was part of the majority which had advocated a more permissive application of the
General Principles to the facts in X v. Latvia.
292 A referral to the Grand Chamber by the Portuguese government was rejected: ECHR 179 (2015), 3
June 2015.
293 See above n. 119, in particular see: Loucaides (2010), p. 61.
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law will continue, bringing uncertainty where the Strasbourg Court once acted as
such a unifying force.294
4 Conclusion
The Neulinger and X v. Latvia cases, through their factual matrices as well as in the
complex, sometimes ambiguous and indeed conflicting nature of their judgments
and dissenting opinions, encapsulate the challenges posed by international child
abduction in the twenty-first century. A problem once seen in simple terms meriting
a relatively straightforward solution has been transformed. Wrongful removals and
retentions carried out by primary carers, most of whom will be mothers who will
have stronger ties to the State of refuge than to the State of the child’s habitual
residence, undoubtedly fit less easily into the summary return mechanism created in
1980. Against such a context there is inevitably greater temptation for courts to
allow return proceedings to drift into a consideration of substantive custody issues.
This may be accentuated where there is evidence of vulnerability on the part of the
abductor, whether through having experienced domestic violence or being in an
economically weak position. But greater sensitivity to such issues also opens the
door to exploitation, most notably should the abductor refuse to return with the
child, leading to a potentially harmful separation. At the same time the essential ill
which the Hague Convention seeks to remedy remains unaltered; unilateral action,
which if unchecked minimises the chances of the child concerned having a
meaningful relationship with the left behind parent and in turn, were it to become
widespread, would simply encourage such behaviour, to the detriment of all
children.
The divergent views that have been expressed and continue to emanate from
Strasbourg as to how compliance with Article 8 ECHR should be achieved in the
application of Hague Convention, show that there is, at best, uncertainty as to how
the interests of abducted children should now be protected. There is attraction
therefore in Eekelaar’s assessment and his classification295 of standard Hague return
applications296 as falling within the ‘indirect’ category of best interests.297 Indeed
this reflects the balancing of rights and interests put forward by the drafters and now
applied in many States Parties. It also facilitates a holistic application of the
UNCRC, allowing account to be taken in particular of Article 11 and Article 41.
However, as with any binary system of categorization there are limits to its
294 Cf. concluding comments of Judge Dedov in Adzˇic´ v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, 12 March 2015. Calling
for a best interests assessment in each individual case he held: ‘a contradictory rule gives rise to
unstable court practice: few judgments are delivered without a dissenting opinion, and there is nothing to
prevent national courts from coming to opposite conclusions in similar situations regarding the
applicability of Article 13 […]’.
295 Eekelaar (2015), p. 3, see above n. 127.
296 Those made within the 12 month period prescribed within Art. 12(1), 1980 Hague Convention.
297 Where settlement is proved for the purposes of Art. 12(2), 1980 Hague Convention Eekelaar notes
that the decision becomes one directly about children.
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application. For example when applied to Neulinger298 the merits of Eekelaar’s
criticism that the two modes of application of the best interests principle were not
distinguished, must surely depend on whether the reasoning of the Grand Chamber
is to be treated as applying to the summary return in general or just the enforcement
of the return order, as the facts of the case demanded.299 By the time the Grand
Chamber delivered its judgment, the child was settled in Switzerland as a matter of
fact, even if not for the purposes of Article 12(2) of the 1980 Hague Convention.
And so any decision taken at that stage would have been of direct, not indirect
effect, to him.
Whilst such extreme examples are rare, it is not uncommon for children to spend
extended periods of time in the State of refuge whilst return proceedings and appeals
run their course. The more integrated a child becomes, then the more difficult it is to
present the issue of return as only of indirect effect. Hague Convention proceedings,
by virtue of their particular nature, might therefore be better regarded as hybrid in
that they have the potential to evolve from having only an indirect to a direct impact
on the children involved. In this a parallel may be drawn with the reasoning
employed by Judges Tulkens and Keller in their concurring opinion in B v.
Belgium.300 They noted that ideally a child should be returned within a year and that
the more a child became integrated into his new surroundings, the weaker the
information to assess the risk of return and the less serious the decision on return
would be. Making an analogy with the Bosphorus principle of equivalent protection
of fundamental rights,301 they noted that where there was such delay the guarantees
offered by the Hague Convention and Article 8 could no longer be considered as
equivalent, making it more difficult to draw a distinction between the procedural
and substantive obligations deriving from the latter provision.302
Such clarity of guidance is helpful. It reflects moreover how the 1980 Hague
Convention, as originally envisaged, can continue to be the most appropriate
solution to cases of unilateral removal or retention. If the standard judicial response
were simply to sanction a more child-centric approach to the application of the
exceptions where the child had spent an extended period of time in the State of
refuge, this would merely be an incentive to abductors to obfuscate and delay. The
more viable and appropriate option therefore, which will also avoid potential
conflict with Article 8 ECHR, would be the introduction of more effective measures
to promote expeditious outcomes.303 But this can only be achieved if States provide
the necessary investment, especially if effective examinations are to be undertaken
where exceptions are raised,304 with, potentially, greater use made of Article 13(3)
of the 1980 Hague Convention. Resources will also be required if adequate
298 Eekelaar (2015), p. 17.
299 See above.
300 B v. Belgium, no. 4320/11, 10 July 2012.
301 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, no. (45036/98, (2006) 42 EHRR
1.
302 B v. Belgium, no. 4320/11, 10 July 2012, concurring opinion Judges Tulkens and Keller, at para. 15.
303 Schuz (2013), pp. 442–443.
304 Fiorini (2006), p. 279.
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protection is to be provided for children and primary carer abductors upon return.
With such steps, as the majority view from Strasbourg makes clear, there is no
reason why the principle of summary return cannot continue to be in the best
interests of the individual child and children collectively for many years to come,
although in the current financial climate the prospect of greater State involvement
must be far from certain.
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